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ARTICLES
AN ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY IS
NOT THE SOLUTION TO TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL
Roberta S. Karmel*
INTRODUCTION
The preamble to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) declares that one of the statute’s primary
purposes is “to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by
ending bailouts.”1 Similarly, when President Obama signed this bill, he
declared that “the American people will never again be asked to foot the bill
for Wall Street’s mistakes. There will be no more taxpayer-funded bailouts,
period.”2 The primary techniques for preventing future bailouts of financial
institutions in Dodd-Frank are the improved regulation of banks, especially
by way of capital controls, the regulation of systemically significant
financial institutions, and the creation of an orderly liquidation authority for
failed firms.3 Unfortunately, the political outlawing of “too big to fail”
represents the triumph of hope over experience.
Although Dodd-Frank is an improvement over the financial regulatory
system that preceded it, it will not abolish “too big to fail” because the
major banks and other financial institutions in the capital markets are too
bigbigger now than they were before the meltdown of 2008and too
complicated. Furthermore, these financial institutions have grown to their
current size and shape because they were permitted, and even encouraged,
to do so by the very same financial agencies that are now supposed to do a
better job of regulating them. These regulators did so for a variety of
reasons that have not been altered by Dodd-Frank.
First, politicians, regulators, and CEOs do not care to preside over
failure, and generally have the ability to “kick that can down the road” for a
long time. Large government bureaucracies find it easier to deal with large
businesses than small businesses, but the consequences of closing down a
*
Roberta S. Karmel is the Centennial Professor and Co-director of the Dennis J. Block
Center for the Study of International Business Law at Brooklyn Law School. She is a former
Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The research assistance of Brooklyn
Law School students Irene Tan, Christopher Garrison, and Katherine Stefanou is gratefully
acknowledged. A summer research grant from Brooklyn Law School was of assistance in the
preparation of this Article.
1. H.R. 4173, 111th Cong., pmbl. (2d Sess. 2010).
2. Frank James, Obama: Financial Bill Means ‘No More . . . Bailouts, Period,’ NPR (July 15,
2010, 6:23 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2010/07/15/128549117/obama-financialbill-means-no-more-bailouts-period.
3. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub.
L. No. 111-203, §§ 171, 204, 804, 124 Stat. 1376, 1435, 1454, 1807 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 5371, 5384, 5463 (2010)).
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very large business are more severe, and regulators will generally go to
great lengths to avoid such a bankruptcy. Second, in order to protect the
federal deposit insurance fund (and similar insurance facilities), financial
regulators have presided over shotgun marriages between distressed banks
and other apparently stronger institutions, regardless of whether these
combinations flouted restrictions against such marriages, or resulted in
larger but weaker financial institutions. Third, growth and size gives banks
advantages that they do not wish to forgo. The larger an organization, the
greater the compensation a CEO can claim and the more influence the
organization can exercise politically. Even when regulators have not been
captured politically by the industries that they regulate, they have been
complicit facilitators of bank growth because they believe that size makes
banks sounder. Unfortunately, as a liquidator of a failed broker-dealer once
said to me, “When you put two dogs together, all you get is a bigger dog.”
Fourth, globalization and regulatory competition have made regulators
fearful of losing entities under their jurisdiction to other authorities. As a
result, regulators have cooperated with the financial institutions that they
regulate in expanding the size and types of businesses in which they are
engaged.
In Part I, this Article will set forth the provisions of Dodd-Frank that
deal with the mechanisms for closing banks and providing liquidity in a
financial crisis, and suggest that, although the orderly liquidation
procedures of Dodd-Frank might make the resolution of a failed mega-bank
less chaotic, these procedures will not prevent any financial institutions
from being too big to fail. In Part II, this Article will discuss the dynamics
behind the creation of the mega-banks: the destruction of the statutorily
imposed geographical restrictions on banking and the separation of
commercial and investment banking through interpretations by the banking
regulators that were first upheld by the courts, and much later endorsed by
Congress. Part II will also recount how some of the biggest banks grew
through mergers and acquisitions that were at times strategic, but at other
times, could be more accurately described as an opportunistic response to
the failure of another bank. My analysis has been informed by my own
experiences as a financial regulator and lawyer for some of the players in
this story of expansion. Part III of this Article will discuss various
mechanisms that have been proposed for dealing with the size and
complexity of the mega-banks.
I am pessimistic about the value of the Dodd-Frank provisions that
were designed to prevent future bailouts in the absence of serious structural
change in the banking world and changes to the financial regulators.
Nevertheless, I recognize that we cannot go backward to simpler capital
markets, and therefore, we have to rationalize financial structures in light of
today’s political and business realities. It is unrealistic to believe that there
will not be financial bubbles in the future and also not to appreciate that the
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size and structure of the financial industry means only governments can
provide the necessary liquidity to stem a financial collapse. Putting
restraints on the agencies that will be required to act in a crisis, instead of
providing them with the tools to meet such a crisis, as the resolution
procedures of Dodd-Frank do to some extent, is shortsighted and
counterproductive. Moreover, the lack of any political will to tackle the
economic and political power of the mega-banks means that they are and
will remain too big to fail.
I. STATUTORY MECHANISMS FOR CLOSING BANKS AND
PROVIDING LIQUIDITY IN A FINANCIAL CRISIS
A. THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION AS
CONSERVATOR
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was historically
allowed to offer financial assistance to a bank before the bank became
insolvent. This was a discretionary power.4 This FDIC policy dictated that
no request for such assistance should be granted unless the FDIC
determined that the “financial impact on executive management, directors,
shareholders and subordinated debt holders [was] comparable to what
would have occurred if the bank had actually closed.”5
The decision to close a bank is made by its primary regulator; when
such a decision is made the FDIC is appointed as conservator of the failed
institution.6 The FDIC can seize control of a commercial bank that is
insolvent or approaching insolvency.7 Under its prior statutes, it then had a
variety of options.8 It could engage in a purchase and assumption
transaction by transferring the failing bank to a solvent institution,9
capitalize a new bank or bridge bank,10 become a receiver and liquidate the
bank, or become a conservator and operate the bank with a view to
rehabilitation.11 Further, it was allowed to inject liquidity into troubled
banks to prevent a receivership or conservatorship.12
One reason the FDIC has a variety of options in liquidating a failed
bank is that it is obliged to resolve a failed bank under the “least cost”
4. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(1) (2006).
5. Statement of Policy and Criteria on Assistance to Operating Insured Banks Which are in
Danger of Failing, 48 Fed. Reg. 38,669, 38,670 (Aug. 25, 1983).
6. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c); see also Lisa Lamkin Broome, Redistributing Bank Insolvency Risks:
Challenges to Limited Liability in the Bank Holding Company Structure, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
935, 943 (1993).
7. 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(f)(2).
8. See Edward R. Morrison, Is the Bankruptcy Code an Adequate Mechanism for Resolving
the Distress of Systemically Important Institutions?, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 449, 455–57 (2009).
9. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(d)(2)(G), 1823(c)(2)(A)(iii).
10. See id. § 1821(m)–(n).
11. See id. § 1821(d)(2)(D)–(E).
12. See id. § 1823(c)(8).
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method.13 This means that the FDIC must resolve the failed bank in a way
that is “least costly to the deposit insurance fund of all possible methods for
meeting [its] obligations.”14 Because of this need to protect the deposit
insurance fund, the FDIC and other regulators customarily attempted to
persuade another financial institution to assume the liabilities and acquire
the assets of a failed or failing bank. Therefore, as banks failed in various
financial crises over the years, the regulators made every effort to find
marriage partners for insolvent banks and, in the process, helped to create
the mega-banks that exist today.
Under Dodd-Frank, although the FDIC’s powers are curtailed in certain
ways, the FDIC now has the power to resolve systemically important
nonbanking financial institutions and financial institution holding
companies in much the same way that the agency has previously resolved
failed banks. Under the new liquidation authority, the Treasury Secretary
would have the authority to appoint the FDIC as receiver of any financial
company if certain conditions are satisfied.15 Unfortunately, a large
financial holding company is much more complicated than a bank, and in
such a situation, liquidation of the failed firm, not rehabilitation, is the
FDIC’s only option.
Absent the need to liquidate, the FDIC may provide a wide range of
financial assistance for the resolution of a covered financial company: this
includes making loans to; or purchasing debt, purchasing assets, assuming
or guaranteeing obligations, taking liens on assets, and selling or
transferring assets or liabilities of; the covered financial company.16
Although the FDIC has broad authority to administer the resolution process,
including the transfer of assets and liabilities to a third party or bridge
financial company,17 it remains to be seen whether the agency has the
expertise or manpower to resolve a mega-bank holding company.
B. LIQUIDITY FUNDING
In a financial crisis, some firms may be insolvent in that, even upon
liquidation, the value of their assets will not sufficiently offset their
liabilities. Other firms may suffer a liquidity crisis, so that if a liquidity
provider is available, the value of their assets will rebound, and they will be
able to continue in business. In the financial crisis of 2008, liquidity
funding through various methods was given to systemically important
financial institutions by the Federal Reserve Board (the Fed) and the FDIC.

13. Id. § 1823(c)(4).
14. See id. § 1823(c)(4)(ii).
15. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 201(a)(8), 124 Stat. 1376, 1443 (2010) (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 5374 (2010)).
16. Id. § 210.
17. See id. § 210(1)(D), (G).
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This liquidity funding was then augmented by funding from the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP).18
Although it was not clear that the Fed and the FDIC had statutory
authority to rehabilitate insolvent financial institutions, they used what
authority they could find to do so. Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve
Act19 allows the Fed to make emergency loans to individual companies,
subject to three requirements: first, “unusual and exigent circumstances”
must exist; second, no fewer than five members of the Fed must approve
the loans; and third, the Fed must obtain evidence that the borrower is
unable to secure adequate credit from other banking institutions.20
Historically, the Fed has rarely used this power; additionally, it was only an
amendment to the banking laws after the 1987 stock market crash that
allowed it to extend such credit to nonbanking institutions.21 This
amendment to the Fed’s powers also relaxed the collateral requirements for
such loans.22
The Obama administration initially requested legislation to broaden the
Fed’s powers under § 13(3),23 but Dodd-Frank restricts such powers.
Previously, the Fed was allowed to make loans to individual companies, but
it can no longer unilaterally do so; but now, emergency lending must be
approved by the Treasury and monitored by Congress. Emergency lending
must also be backed by collateral that is sufficient to protect taxpayers.24
During the financial crisis, the FDIC used the “systemic risk exception”
to its normal receivership rules to establish the Temporary Liquidity
Guaranty Program. This program afforded federally insured depositories the
ability to issue unsecured short-term debt with a federal government
guarantee. After Dodd-Frank, however, the FDIC can only extend such
credit to solvent banks. Further, the Fed and the FDIC must agree that a
liquidity event has occurred and place limits on the guarantees to financial
institutions so that they will not be a source of moral hazard.25

18. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 2(1), 122 Stat.
3765, 3766 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (2008)); see also James B. Stewart, Eight Days: The
Battle to Save the American Financial System, NEW YORKER, Sept. 21, 2009, at 79.
19. Federal Reserve Act § 13(3), 12 U.S.C. § 343(A)–(E) (2006).
20. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Avoiding Eight-Alarm Fires in the Political
Economy of Systemic Risk Management 30 (Colum. L. and Econs., Working Paper No. 369, 2010;
Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 277, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1553880 (2010).
21. See id. at 33–34.
22. Id.
23. Federal Reserve Act § 13(3).
24. Id. § 13(3)(B)(i).
25. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1104, 124 Stat. 1376, 2120 (2010) (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 5611 (2010)).
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The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act26 provided for the
government purchase of assets from distressed financial institutions up to
the expenditure of $800 billion. Although it was initially envisioned that the
government would purchase toxic, illiquid assets held by financial
institutions, these funds were actually used to buy preferred stock in nine
major financial institutions for a total of $125 billion, and to otherwise
recapitalize failing financial firms. While much of the TARP money used to
stabilize the financial system has been repaid, this program was widely
criticized as a “bailout” and led to certain of the restrictions on the Fed and
others to prevent future liquidity assistance to distressed financial
institutions.
In my opinion, all of these restrictions portend that, when there is a
future financial crisis, the financial regulators may have less, rather than
more, flexibility both in determining how to deal with the crisis and in
injecting liquidity that may be needed into the financial system. One
problem is the funding mechanism for the new orderly liquidation authority.
Although the Senate bill provided for a fund of $50 billion, to be created
over a period of five to ten years and to be held by the Treasury, the final
version of Dodd-Frank provides for funding of any money expended by the
FDIC in resolving troubled financial institutions only after the fact. In order
to function as receiver, the FDIC is authorized to issue obligations and
borrow funds in the first thirty days of a receivership for 10 percent of the
book value of assets of the company in receivership, and thereafter the
FDIC may borrow up to 90 percent of the fair value of the assets of the
company that are available for repayment.27 Next, the FDIC must establish
an assessment process to repay the obligations issued by it as receiver in
connection with the liquidation within sixty months. If it is not repaid, then
the FDIC must levy an assessment on bank holding companies with
consolidated assets of $50 billion or more, and on nonbank financial
companies supervised by the Fed as systemically significant financial
institutions and other financial companies with assets of $50 billion or
more.28
The rationale of Dodd-Frank is firstly, that improved supervision and
regulation by the financial regulators will prevent financial institution
failures; and secondly, that individual firms that fail, notwithstanding these
measures, should be liquidated. This rationale is very troublesome because
the statute neither changes the basic structure of the financial services
industry, nor significantly curbs the size, powers, or activities of financial
holding companies, but continues to rely on the very same regulators who
26. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 107, 122 Stat.
3765, 3817 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5217 (2008)).
27. Dodd-Frank Act, § 210(n)(6), 124 Stat. 1507 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390). This ability to
borrow is limited by agreement with the Treasury Secretary and a repayment plan.
28. See id. § 210(o)(1).
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failed to prevent the 2008 meltdown. Although Dodd-Frank makes many
improvements in the regulation of financial institutions, in my opinion,
these improvements are insufficient to prevent future financial bubbles and
their inevitable puncture. Financial crises have different immediate causes,
and therefore are difficult to predict; further, financial bubbles come from
psychological delusions and generally are pricked by recognition of reality.
Why should regulators, however well intentioned, be presumed to have the
vision and foresight that market place participants are lacking?
II. HOW THE MEGA-BANKS GREW
A. OVERVIEW
According to Henry Kaufman, the greatest failing of Dodd-Frank was
one of design:
[T]he act did not deal correctly with the problem of the extraordinary
concentration of assets held by a small number of large financial
institutions. . . .
The new legislation supposedly heightens surveillance over these
giant institutions, and allows regulators to engineer their orderly
dissolution. This sounds plausible, but on closer examination amounts
only to a new protective ring around these institutions, an arrangement
posing huge risks. . . . For where will their assets end up, if not in the
hands of the federal government, or one of the remaining giants?29

I could not agree more.
In another article, I have argued that the Public Utility Holding
Company Act should be examined to provide a model for breaking up the
mega-banks, just as the public utility holding companies were broken up
after the 1929 stock market crash.30 I will not repeat that analysis here.
Rather, I will tell the story of how the federal bank regulators expanded the
business models of banks by punching holes in the Glass-Steagall Act
(Glass-Steagall)31 wall that separated commercial and investment
bankinga wall that was finally knocked down by the Gramm-LeachBliley Act (Gramm-Leach-Bliley)32and how these same regulators
approved the mergers and acquisitions that led to the creation of the three
mega-banks that dominate banking today. The sad fact is that the regulatory
failures of the Fed, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC or
29. Henry Kaufman, America Must Start Again on Financial Regulation, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 17,
2010, at 11.
30. Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Public Utility Holding Company Act a Model for Breaking Up
the Banks that are Too-Big-to-Fail?, 62 HASTINGS L. J. 821 (2011).
31. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 335,
377, 378).
32. Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101(a), 113 Stat.
1338 (codified in scattered sections of 12 & 15 U.S.C.).
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the Comptroller) and the FDIC allowed banks to grow into the gargantuan,
complex, and unwieldy holding companies that became too big to fail.
During the period of 1980 to 1994, regulators approved a record
number of mergers33: the Fed approved 4,507, the OCC approved 972, and
the FDIC approved 868.34 Furthermore, the regulators failed to regulate the
blatant use of bank holding companies as a vehicle for circumventing
interstate banking and activities restrictions. These regulatory actions, and
in many cases omissions, resulted in expansionary branching and
hyperactive merger activity.
Today, the three largest bank holding companies are Bank of America
Corporation (Bank of America), JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPMorgan
Chase), and Citigroup Inc. (Citigroup).35 These three companies were
allowed or encouraged to acquire major investment banking organizations.36
Notably, the predecessors to these companies include the top merger-active
firms during the period of 1980 to 1994, including the top six: Citicorp,
BankAmerica Corp. (BankAmerica), Chemical Banking Corp. (Chemical
Bank), NationsBank Corp. (NationsBank), J.P. Morgan & Co. Inc. (J.P.
Morgan), and Chase Manhattan Corp. (Chase). Bank of America’s
predecessors include BankAmerica and NationsBank. During the financial
crisis, Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch & Co. (Merrill Lynch).
JPMorgan Chase is an amalgamation of Chemical Bank, J.P. Morgan, and
Chase. During the financial crisis, JPMorgan Chase, with financial
assistance from the Fed, acquired Bear Stearns & Co. Citigroup has, as one
of its predecessors, Citicorp. Citicorp already owned Smith Barney & Co.
and Solomon Bros.; and as a result of its acquisition of Travelers Group, it
challenged Congress to enact Gramm-Leach-Bliley. The aggressive merger
activity of these predecessor banks, all of which were approved by bank
regulators, contributed to the development of today’s three largest bank
holding companies. Each of these banks was deemed “too big to fail,” and
each was assisted or rescued by the federal government during the financial
crisis of 2008.

33. Stephen A. Rhoades, Bank Mergers and Industrywide Structure, 1980–94, at 1 (Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Staff Studies Series No. 169, 1996).
34. Id. at 19.
35. The Fed’s June 30, 2011 performance reports indicate that Bank of America had total
assets of $2,264,435,837,000, JPMorgan Chase had total assets of $2,246,764,000,000, and
Citigroup had total assets of $1,956,626,000,000. Top 50 Bank Holding Companies, NAT’L INFO.
CTR., http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/Top50Form.aspx (data as of June 30, 2011) (to
access the performance reports, follow the hyperlink of the relevant company; then under “Bank
Holding Company Performance Report (BHCPR),” highlight “2011-6-30” and click “Create
Report”; then follow the “Your request for a financial report is ready” hyperlink after it appears).
36. See infra text accompanying notes 277–83, 307–09, 340–46.
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B. DESTRUCTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL AND ACTIVITIES
RESTRICTIONS
Some of the important restrictions on banks designed to prevent
excessive concentration of financial power were the prohibitions against
branching interstate and intrastate. These restrictions were based on a desire
to control banks at a community level, to have and encourage close
relationships between bankers and borrowers within those communities,
and to avoid centralized financial power.37 When the federal banking
system was established in 1864, the National Banking Act allowed banks to
be either chartered as a state or a national bank, but national banks were not
permitted to branch.38 In 1927, Congress authorized national banks to open
a limited number of branches in local communities if the law of that state
permitted state-chartered banks to do so; then, by way of a 1933
amendment, it provided national banks with full equality to branch
throughout their home state to the same extent the state permitted its own
banks to branch.39
In the 1940s and 1950s, banks formed bank holding companies as a
device around the restrictions on interstate and intrastate branching. The
holding company structure allowed a bank to effectively create a branch in
different states or communities even though branching was not allowed.40
The Douglas Amendment of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
(BHCA)41 partially closed this end run around geographic restrictions by
prohibiting a bank holding company from acquiring an interstate bank
unless there was explicit statutory authorization by the state where the bank
to be acquired was located.42
In the early 1990s, Congress finally ended branching restrictions by
passing the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of
1994 (Riegle-Neal).43 A number of reasons were given for the statute,
including: the concern that geographic banking restrictions hindered the

37. Patrick Mulloy & Cynthia Lasker, The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act of 1994: Responding to Global Competition, 21 J. LEGIS. 255, 255 (1995).
38. See generally National Banking Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (repealed 1953); see also
First Nat’l Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 655–58 (1924) (holding that national
banks are prohibited from branching).
39. McFadden Act, ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (1927) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 36
(2006)); Mulloy & Lasker, supra note 37, at 257.
40. Mulloy & Lasker, supra note 37, at 257 (quoting Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Act of 1994, S. REP. NO. 103-240, at 6 (1994)).
41. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133, 135 (1956) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (2000)), repealed in part by the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking
and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
42. Mulloy & Lasker, supra note 37, at 258. As some states recognized the benefits holding
companies offered in terms of attracting new investment capital to their states, this restriction
slowly eroded but in some cases was limited by reciprocity requirements. Id.
43. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 2338.
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competitiveness of the U.S. banking industry; and the belief that interstate
branching would promote diversification of bank assets and loan portfolios,
and that greater customer convenience and choice would result.44 RiegleNeal allowed bank holding companies to acquire separate banks in multiple
states as long as the Fed found the holding company adequately capitalized
and managed. In addition, the OCC was authorized by Riegle-Neal to
approve the establishment and operation of interstate national bank
branches,45 and the FDIC was similarly authorized to approve interstate
branches of insured state nonmember banks.46
Some of the cases that will be discussed below relate to efforts by the
banking regulators to allow national banks to expand across state lines, thus
undermining the restriction on interstate banking. The most important
activities and conflict of interest restrictions for purposes of this Article,
however, were those in Glass-Steagall, which was passed in 1933 as an
important part of the New Deal effort to restore public confidence in the
country’s financial system. It was linked with the passage of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act,47 which provided federal insurance for retail bank
accounts. This legislation had two types of provisions separating investment
and commercial banking. Direct combinations were regulated under § 16 of
the Banking Act of 1933, which prohibited national banks and state banks
that were members of the Federal Reserve System from purchasing,
underwriting, or dealing in securities, except as provided in the Act.48
Additionally, § 21 prohibited institutions involved in underwriting, selling,
or distributing securities from also taking deposits.49
The second type of provision prevented indirect combinations. Section
20 prohibited Federal Reserve System member banks from being affiliated
with any organization engaged in the issuance, underwriting, public sale, or
distribution of non-exempt securities.50 Section 32 prohibited Federal
Reserve System and state member banks from sharing personnel with
entities primarily engaged in the issuance, underwriting, public sale, or
distribution of securities.51
The restrictions that were placed on bank holding companies were
driven by two impetuses: the threat of concentration that widespread
interstate banking posed, and the fear that the economic system would be

44.
45.
46.
47.

Mulloy & Lasker, supra note 37, at 266, 269.
12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (2006).
Id. § 1828(d)(4) (amended 2010).
Pub. L. No. 81-797, 64 Stat. 873 (1950) (codified as amended 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811–1835a
(2006)).
48. 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1934) (amended 1999).
49. Id. § 378 (amended 1978).
50. Id. § 377 (repealed 1999).
51. Id. § 78 (repealed 1999).
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dominated by colossal banking and industrial conglomerates.52 Therefore,
restrictions on the nonbank activities of bank holding companies were
designed to prevent a bank holding company from performing activities that
could not be performed directly by a bank. Many commercial businesses
feared that firms affiliated with banks could gain a competitive advantage
over unaffiliated competitors in the same industry if they were in a position
to receive preferential credit treatment from the banks.53 Also, business and
policy leaders feared that access to credit would be tied to the purchase of
services from a bank’s nonbank affiliates.54
As a result, the BHCA severely restricted nonbank activities and only
permitted those activities incidental to banking or performing services for
banks, such as ownership of the bank’s premises, auditing and appraisal,
and safe deposit services.55
In general, the law required that nonconforming nonbank businesses be
divested over a period of years, but the [Fed] was given the power to allow
retention of activities in the areas of banking, finance, or insurance, if
these activities were “. . . so closely related to the business of banking or
of managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto. . . .”56

During the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, the bank regulators and Congress
engaged in a general deregulation of banking that, over time, permitted
banks, especially large-money-center banks, to engage in most aspects of
the securities business. Illustrative of the de-regulatory initiatives of the
banking authorities are a series of rulings, many of which were contested by
the Securities Industry Association (SIA),57 a trade association that relaxed
the activities restrictions of the banking statutes. In 1974, the OCC
interpreted Glass-Steagall to allow banks to offer computer-assisted stock
purchasing services to checking account employees. Then, in 1982, the
OCC allowed such services to be extended to existing banking and also
nonbanking clients. Further, this interpretation applied to the brokerage
activities of the bank itself, as well as a bank subsidiary.58
The SIA eventually challenged the brokerage activities of national
banks in Clarke v. Securities Industry Association. The case involved two
52. J. Nellie Liang & Donald T. Savage, The Nonbank Activities of Bank Holding Companies,
76 FED. RES. BULL. 280, 281 (1990).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. (alteration in original).
57. In 2006, the SIA and the Bond Market Association merged to create the Securities Industry
and Financial Markets Association. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Merger of Wall Street Groups Creates a
Lobbying Powerhouse, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2006, at D1, available at http://www
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/26/AR2006112600647.html.
58. Cf. Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 634–35 (1971) (describing the OCC’s “position
that the operation of a bank investment fund is consistent with [Glass-Steagall] because
participating interests in such a fund are not ‘securities’”).

12

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 6

national banks, Union Planters National Bank of Memphis (Union Planters)
and petitioner Security Pacific National Bank of Los Angeles (SPN), that
had applied to the OCC for permission to open offices offering discount
brokerage59 services to the public.60 Both banks wanted to offer discount
brokerage services at their branch offices and other locations inside and
outside of their home states.61 Union Planters sought permission to acquire
an existing discount brokerage operation, and SPN hoped to establish an
affiliate named Discount Brokerage.62 Upon review of the applications, the
Comptroller approved both SPN’s and Union Planters’ applications.63
SPN’s application to the OCC raised the issue of whether the operation
of a discount brokerage violated the National Bank Act’s branching
provisions.64 The Comptroller approved SPN’s application, concluding that
“the non-chartered offices at which Discount Brokerage will offer its
services will not constitute branches under the McFadden Act because none
of the statutory functions will be performed there.”65 The SIA brought suit
arguing that bank discount brokerage offices were offices within the
meaning of § 36(f), and were subject to the geographical restrictions
imposed by § 36(c).66
The Supreme Court held that respondent had standing to maintain the
lawsuit, and that the Comptroller did not exceed his authority in approving
SPN’s application.67 First, the Court emphasized the great weight given to
the Comptroller’s interpretations.68 Second, the Court rejected the SIA’s
argument that the Comptroller’s interpretation of the National Bank Act

59. A discount brokerage house executes trades on behalf of customers at a reduced
commission but does not offer investment advice. Discount Broker Definition, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/discountbroker.asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2011).
60. Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 390–91 (1987).
61. Id. at 391.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 392.
64. Id. at 391. The McFadden Act limited the “general business” of a national bank to its
headquarters and any branches permitted by § 36. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 36, 81). Section 36(c)
provided that a national bank was permitted to branch only its home state and only to the extent
that a bank of the same state is permitted to branch under state law. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c). The term
“branch” was defined as “any branch bank, branch office, branch agency, additional office, or any
branch place of business . . . at which deposits are received, or checks paid, or money lent.” Id.
§ 36(j).
65. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 391.
66. Id. at 392–93.
67. Id. at 394.
68. Id. at 403.
It is settled that court should give great weight to any reasonable construction of a
regulatory statute adopted by the agency charged with the enforcement of that statute.
The Comptroller of the Currency is charged with the enforcement of banking laws to an
extent that warrants the invocation of this principle with respect to his deliberative
conclusions as to meaning of these laws.
Id. (citing Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626–27 (1971)).
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contradicted the plain language of 12 U.S.C. § 81 when it broadly
interpreted § 81 as delineating that “national banks may locate their
business only at their headquarters or licensed branches within the same
state.”69 The Court reasoned that § 81 did not need to be read to encompass
all the businesses in which the bank engages, but could be read to cover
only those activities that were part of the bank’s core banking functions.70
Therefore, the Court found that the Comptroller’s position that “the
amendment [to the National Bank Act] simply codified the accepted notion
that the ‘usual business’ of a bank was the ‘general banking business.’”71
Because the Court deferred to the Comptroller’s liberalization of the
restrictions on national banks, this decision gave a green light to the further
deregulation of banking by the OCC and the Fed.
In a key ruling regarding the sale of securitized mortgages, the OCC
determined that the sale of mortgage pass through certificates by SPN was
not in violation of Glass-Steagall.72 The Comptroller concluded that
the Bank’s program, as described in the Prospectus and Prospectus
Supplement dated January 23, 1987, is squarely based on long-standing
precedent that is fully supported by applicable law and subsequent court
decisions interpreting these laws. In pooling its mortgage loans and selling
interests therein, the Bank is merely engaging in a permitted sale of its
mortgage assets. We cannot conclude that the Glass-Steagall Act is
intended to preclude banks from conducting this activity.73

The SIA challenged this ruling in Securities Industry Association v.
Clarke, claiming that the Comptroller’s ruling was “arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, in excess of his statutory authority and otherwise not in
accordance with the law, and that it is, therefore, null and void.”74 Although
the district court granted the SIA’s motion for summary judgment, finding
that the Comptroller’s decision violated federal law,75 the Second Circuit
vacated the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss
the complaint.76 The Second Circuit noted the Supreme Court’s explicit
guidance in Clarke v. Securities Industry Association that “courts should
give great weight to any reasonable construction of a regulatory statute
adopted by the agency charged with the enforcement of that statute.”77
The Second Circuit extensively reviewed the Comptroller’s findings.
The Comptroller found that national banks had the authority to sell their

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 405–06.
Id. at 406.
Id.
Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Clarke, 885 F.2d 1034, 1036 (2d. Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1038.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1052.
Id. at 1042.
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mortgage loans generally on three grounds: (1) “since the enactment of the
National Bank Act of 1864, national banks have had the express power to
‘carry on the business of banking . . . by negotiating promissory notes . . .
and other evidences of debt’”; (2) the Supreme Court had held that the sale
of mortgages was within the incidental powers of national banks; and (3)
under 12 U.S.C. § 371(a), national banks were permitted to “make, arrange,
purchase or sell loans or extensions of credit secured by liens on interests in
real estate.”78 Therefore, the Comptroller determined “it is clearly
established that national banks may sell their mortgage assets under the
express authority of 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 (Seventh) and 371(a).”79 In addition,
the Comptroller determined that SPN’s use of mortgage-backed pass
through certificates was either a new way of selling bank assets or an
activity incidental to an authorized banking practice.80 Furthermore, the
Comptroller determined that the prohibitions and concerns of GlassSteagall were not implicated.81
Although the Comptroller’s interpretation was arguably broad,82 the
Second Circuit held that the Comptroller had correctly determined that
SPN’s sale of the certificates was within the “business of banking.”83 The
Second Circuit found that the Comptroller’s conclusion that SPN’s activity
was encompassed by its power to carry on the business of banking, and that
the Comptroller’s interpretation of § 16 was supported by Bankers Trust I.
In Bankers Trust I, the Supreme Court distinguished between activities that
fell within “the business of banking” and the “business of dealing.” The
Court held that activity that falls within the “business of banking” was not
prohibited by Glass-Steagall’s § 16.84 Here, the Second Circuit found that it
was reasonable for the Comptroller to determine that SPN’s activities were
within the “business of banking,” and therefore, not prohibited by GlassSteagall.85 This key ruling on the securitization of mortgages transformed
the business of mortgage lending from an originate-to-hold model to an
originate-to-distribute model and essentially allowed banks to become
underwriters of securities.
The Fed was also active in allowing banks and bank holding companies
to expand their business activities in derogation of the geographical and
activities limitations of the federal banking laws, and courts have generally

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 1044.
Id.
Id. at 1044–45.
Id. at 1045.
See Edward J. Markey, Why Congress Must Amend Glass-Steagall: Recent Trends in
Breaching the Wall Separating Commercial and Investment Banking, 25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 457,
471–72 (1990).
83. Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Clarke, 885 F.2d at 1047–48.
84. Id. at 1048 (citing Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Bankers
Trust I), 468 U.S. 137, 158 n.11 (1984)).
85. Id.
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deferred to the Fed’s interpretations. Of particular significance to this
Article, the Fed exercises certain supervisory and examination functions
over state-chartered member banks.86 These powers include “the
administration of federal laws regulating the formation and activities of
bank holding companies.”87 In addition, the Fed administers the Bank
Merger Act which involves mergers where “the acquiring, assuming, or
resulting bank, is a state chartered member bank[,]” and involves the
issuance of securities by state-chartered member banks.88 Like the OCC, the
Fed enabled banks to enter the discount brokerage business when
BankAmerica Corp. (BankAmerica), a bank holding company predecessor
to Bank of America, applied for approval to acquire 100 percent of the
voting shares of The Charles Schwab Corp. and its retail brokerage
subsidiary, Charles Schwab & Co. (Schwab). The Fed approved
BankAmerica’s application, thereby raising the issue of whether the Fed
had the statutory authority under § 4(c)(8) of the BHCA to authorize a bank
holding company to acquire a nonbanking affiliate engaged principally in
retail securities brokerage.89
The SIA petitioned for review of the Fed’s decision. First, the SIA
argued that the Fed could “not approve an activity as ‘closely related’ to
banking unless it [found] that the activity facilitated other banking
operations.”90 Second, the SIA argued that § 20 of Glass-Steagall prohibited
a bank holding company from owning any entity that is engaged principally
in retail securities brokerage services.91 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit
held that the Fed acted within its statutory authority and affirmed the Fed’s
order; upon appeal the Supreme Court affirmed.92
To qualify for the § 4(c)(8) exception, the Fed was required to
determine (1) whether the proposed activity was “closely related” to
banking, and (2) whether allowing BankAmerica to engage in the activity
may reasonably be expected to produce public benefits that outweigh any
adverse effects.93 First, the Fed determined that the securities brokerage
services offered by Schwab were “closely related” to banking because (1) at
the time, banks offered, as an accommodation to their customers, brokerage
services that were virtually identical to the services offered by Schwab; (2)
bank trust department trading desks performed the same functions as
brokers; and (3) banks engaged in the widespread use of sophisticated
techniques and resources to execute purchase and sell orders for their
customers and were therefore equipped to offer the type of retail brokerage
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION § 1.03[B] at 1-54 (2d ed. 2011).
Id. at 1-54 to -55 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841 et seq.).
Id. at 1-55 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2)(B); 15 U.S.C. § 781(i)).
Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 207, 208 (1984).
Id. at 213.
Id.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 210–11.

16

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 6

services provided by Schwab.94 For these reasons, the Fed concluded that a
securities brokerage business that is “essentially confined to the purchase
and sale of securities for the account of third parties, and without the
provision of investment advice to the purchaser or seller is ‘closely related’
to banking within the meaning of § 4(c)(8) of the [BHCA].”95 Second, the
Fed determined that the public benefits likely to result from BankAmerica’s
acquisition of Schwab outweighed the possible adverse effects.96 It
reasoned that the acquisition would result in increased competition,
convenience, and efficiencies in the retail brokerage business,97 and that
these public benefits outweighed any possible adverse effects of undue
concentration of resources, decreased competition, or unfair competitive
prices.98 Third, the Fed concluded that BankAmerica’s acquisition of
Schwab was not prohibited because Schwab was not “engaged principally
in any of the activities prohibited to member bank affiliates by the GlassSteagall Act.”99
The Supreme Court rejected the SIA’s first argument that § 4(c)(8)
required that a proposed activity must facilitate other banking operations
before it may be found to be “closely related” to banking, reasoning that the
statute does not specify any factors that the Fed must consider in making
that determination.100 Since the Fed’s interpretation is entitled to the
“greatest deference,” the Court held that the court of appeals properly
deferred to the Fed’s determination.101 The Court also rejected the SIA’s
second argument that the term “public sale” of securities in § 20 applied to
brokerage businesses, reasoning that statutory interpretation and legislative
history supported the Fed’s interpretation that brokerage services were not
prohibited by the statute.102
Another milestone in dismantling the Glass-Steagall wall was the Fed’s
grant of authority to banks to sell and underwrite commercial paper.
Although the Fed initially lost its argument that commercial paper was not a
“security” under Glass-Steagall,103 it won the argument that agency sales of
commercial paper were not “underwriting.”104 In Bankers Trust I, Bankers
Trust Company (Bankers Trust), a state commercial bank that was a
member of the Federal Reserve System began serving as agent for several

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 211–12.
Id. at 213.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 214–15.
Id. at 215–16.
Id. at 217–21.
Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. 137, 139–40 (1984).
Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Bankers Trust II), 807
F.2d 1052, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987).
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of its corporate customers and marketing their commercial paper.105 The
SIA petitioned the Fed for a ruling that such activities were unlawful under
§§ 16 and 21.106 The Fed ruled that commercial paper fell outside the
proscriptions of Glass-Steagall.107
The Fed reasoned that if a particular kind of financial instrument
evidenced a transaction that was more functionally similar to a traditional
commercial banking operation than to an investment transaction, then the
instrument should not be viewed as a “security” for purposes of GlassSteagall.108 Applying this “functional analysis” to commercial paper, the
Fed concluded that such paper more closely resembled a commercial bank
loan than an investment transaction and that it was, therefore, not a
“security” for purposes of Glass-Steagall.109 Having come to this
conclusion, the Fed “did not consider whether Bankers Trust’s involvement
with commercial paper constituted ‘underwriting’ within the meaning of
[Glass-Steagall].”110
In response, first, the SIA argued that commercial paper constituted a
“note” within the meaning of § 21, and alternatively, that it was
encompassed by the inclusive term “other securities.”111 Second, the SIA
argued that the role played by Bankers Trust in placing the commercial
paper of third parties was precisely the type of activity prohibited by GlassSteagall.112 The Fed reasoned that Congress intended a narrower definition,
and that Glass-Steagall was meant to prohibit the underwriting of only those
notes that share “that characteristic of an investment that is the common
feature of each of the other enumerated instruments.”113 The Supreme Court
rejected the Fed’s reasoning because the legislative history strongly
suggested that Congress’ use of “security” encompassed “note.”114 The
Court specifically pointed to the Securities Act of 1933, which defines the
term “security” to include “any note.”115 The Court held that commercial
paper was a “security” under Glass-Steagall and, therefore, was subject to
its proscriptions.116 The Court remanded the case to the lower court to
determine whether Bankers Trust’s placement of commercial paper
constituted the “underwriting” or “business of issuing, underwriting, selling
or distributing” that Glass-Steagall prohibited.117
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Bankers Trust I, 468 U.S. at 140.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 141.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 149.
Id.
Id. at 149–50.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 150–51.
Id. at 160 n.11.
Id. at 160 n.12.
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Upon remand, the Fed found that Bankers Trust’s placement of
commercial paper constituted a § 16 violation—the “‘selling’ of a security
without recourse and solely upon the order and for the account of
customers.”118 Although the district court granted summary judgment for
the SIA, holding that Bankers Trust’s activities involved “underwriting”
and “distributing” that was prohibited by § 21,119 the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia reversed the lower court’s decision, reinstating the
Fed’s decision.120
The circuit court began its analysis by stating that the Fed’s decision
was to be given “substantial deference.”121 First, the court looked at whether
the commercial banking activities of Bankers Trust fell within the
parameters of § 16.122 The court found reasonable the Fed’s determination
that Bankers Trust’s activities fell within § 16’s requirement that
the business of dealing in securities and stock by the [bank] shall be
limited to purchasing and selling such securities without recourse, solely
upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its
own account, and the [bank] shall not underwrite any issue of securities of
stock.123

In response, the SIA, first, argued that the permissive language in § 16
did not apply to the activities of Bankers Trust because the exception only
applied to “the business of dealing in securities and stock” and that “dealing
is typically understood to encompass the purchasing and selling of stock in
the secondary market.”124 The court rejected this argument because the
Securities Act of 1934 defines “dealer” as a person who engages in the
dealing of securities without exclusion of the primary offering market.125
Second, the SIA argued that the Fed erred in concluding that the activities
of Bankers Trust were upon the order of customers because (1) it had to be
limited to preexisting customers of the bank, and (2) the bank solicited the
business of issuers and gave financial advice about the terms and timing of
the issue of commercial paper.126 The court rejected this argument,
determining that (1) § 16 did not restrict the placement of securities to
preexisting customers,127 and (2) there was no evidence supporting the
claim that Bankers Trust recruits or solicits the business of issuers.128 Third,
118. Bankers Trust II, 807 F.2d 1052, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005
(1987).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1056.
122. Id. at 1057.
123. Id. at 1058.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1059.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1060.
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the SIA argued that the activities of Bankers Trust amounted to
“underwriting,” and were therefore barred from the § 16 exemption.129
Nevertheless, the court found reasonable the Fed’s conclusion that “an
‘underwriting’ defeats the section 16 exemption only if it includes a public
offering.”130
Lastly, the SIA asked the court to analyze the activities approved by the
Fed to determine whether they posed the “subtle hazards” that GlassSteagall sought to eliminate.131 The court determined that the investment of
bank funds in speculative securities was not at issue because Bankers Trust
did not purchase the commercial paper of its customers, did not inventory
the paper overnight, and did not make loans to provide financing to an
issuer where an offering of paper fell short of its goal.132 Accordingly, the
court of appeals reversed the district court’s order.
An even more important event in cracking open the Glass-Steagall wall
was the Fed’s approval of so-called § 20 subsidiaries that happened when
the Fed approved applications by large bank holding companies to utilize
subsidiaries as the vehicle through which to underwrite and deal in certain
securities.133 The Fed approved the applications of Citicorp, J.P. Morgan &
Co. Inc., Bankers Trust New York Corp., Chase Manhattan Corp.,
Chemical New York Corp., Manufacturer’s Hanover Trust Corporation, and
Security Pacific Corp., to engage in limited securities activities through
wholly-owned subsidiaries.134 In response, the SIA petitioned for review,
arguing that the approved activities violated § 20 of Glass-Steagall.135
The Fed’s determination that the approved securities were “closely
related” to banking was not contested on appeal.136 Rather, the main issue
was whether the approval of the activities contravened Glass-Steagall.137
First, the Fed reasoned that Congress did not intend in § 20 to proscribe
bank affiliates from engaging in bank eligible activities since § 16
authorized banks to engage in underwriting and dealing in governmental
securities.138 Therefore, the Fed argued that “it would be anomalous not to
permit the bank’s subsidiary to engage in the activities lawfully permitted
by the bank.”139 Second, the Fed determined that an affiliate was “engaged

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 1062.
Id.
Id. at 1066.
Id. at 1067.
Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Bankers Trust III), 839
F.2d 47, 49 (2d. Cir. 1987).
134. Id. at 50.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 51. Bank eligible securities are governmental securities; bank ineligible securities are
those types of securities that under § 16 banks cannot themselves deal in or underwrite. Id.
139. Id.
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principally” in such activity only when there was “substantial activity.”140
The Fed concluded that subsidiaries would not be engaged substantially in
bank-ineligible activities if, over a two-year period, such activities
contributed to no more than 5–10 percent of the total gross revenues of
those subsidiaries, and if those activities in connection with any type of
bank-ineligible security constituted no more than 5–10 percent of the
market for that particular security.141
The SIA made two arguments. First, the SIA argued that the Fed
erroneously construed Glass-Steagall, reasoning that § 20 limits both bank
eligible and bank ineligible securities activities by a member bank
affiliate.142 Second, the SIA contested the Fed’s construction of “engaged
principally.”143 The court acknowledged that it was required to uphold the
Fed’s interpretation of Glass-Steagall if it was reasonable but determined
that the Fed’s decision was ambiguous.144 The court nevertheless concluded
that § 20 did not proscribe activities by bank affiliates in bank eligible
securities. First, the court examined the legislative history and determined
that Congress, concerned primarily with bank affiliates’ activities in bank
ineligible securities, did not want to limit all securities activities.145 Second,
the court examined prior judicial construction and determined that the Fed’s
interpretation of § 20 was not precluded by the “subtle hazards” analysis146
because Congress did not believe that the risks were significant when banks
engaged in activities relating to bank eligible securities as allowed under
§ 16.147 Therefore, the court concluded that the Fed’s construction of § 20,
that “securities” did not encompass those securities which § 16 allowed
banks themselves to underwrite, was reasonable.148
In another important interpretation of § 20, the Fed concluded that the
combined provision of securities brokerage services and investment advice
by a member bank’s affiliate did not contravene § 20’s prohibition of the
public sale of securities.149 The SIA petitioned the court to review the Fed’s
decision.150 Nevertheless, the court held that the Fed’s decision was a

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 52–53.
Id. at 60–61.
Id. at 61. The “‘subtle hazards’ analysis [was] developed in Camp and [is] used by the
Supreme Court in . . . Glass-Steagall Act cases.” Id. “[T]he Court noted the hazards that Congress
sought to prevent when [Glass-Steagall] was passed and then examined whether a particular
activity would implicate them.” Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 62.
149. Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 821 F.2d 810, 811 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
150. Id. at 810.
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reasonable interpretation of the language and denied the petition for
review.151
In the case, National Westminster Bank PLC and its subsidiary
NatWest Holdings, Inc. (collectively, NatWest) sought permission from the
Fed to provide institutional customers with investment advice and securities
brokerage services through a newly formed subsidiary, County Services
Corporation (CSC).152 CSC would restrict its brokerage services to buying
and selling securities solely as agent for the account of its customers, and
would hold itself out as a separate and distinct corporate entity from
NatWest.153 The Fed approved NatWest’s application reasoning (1) that
CSC’s proposed activities were “closely related” to banking, (2) that the
proposal may be reasonably expected to result in public benefits
outweighing any possible adverse effects, and (3) that NatWest’s
acquisition of CSC would not violate Glass-Steagall because the
combination of investment advice and execution services did not constitute
a “public sale” of securities.154
The SIA argued that CSC’s proposed services violated § 20 because (1)
CSC was offering investment advice, and (2) the activities implicated the
“subtle hazards” that Glass-Steagall was designed to protect against.155
Upon review, the court noted, once again, that the Fed’s decision was
entitled to “substantial deference” so long as its interpretation of statute was
reasonable.156 First, the court held that the Fed’s construction of a “public
sale” was reasonable and that the addition of investment advice to
brokerage activities did not implicate any activities which were traditionally
associated with underwriting.157 The court rejected the SIA’s argument that
CSC’s provision of investment advice to its customers transformed the
proposed activities into the public sale of securities because it was not a
critical attribute of underwriting.158 Second, the court held that the “subtle
hazards” analysis was unnecessary because CSC did not conduct activities
that were prohibited by Glass-Steagallit did not “hold and sell particular
investments,” or “purchase and sell [securities] on [its] own account.”159
Similarly, when Chase Manhattan Corporation applied for permission
for its affiliate, Chase Commercial Corporation (Chase Commercial) to
underwrite and deal in commercial paper, the Fed approved.160 The Fed

151.
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153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
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Id. at 811–12.
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Id. at 816.
Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 847 F.2d 890, 893 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
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reasoned that Chase Commercial’s § 20 activity would not be substantial in
light of the revenue and market share limitations that it agreed to impose,
and that its proposal was consistent with the BHCA.161 Again, the SIA
petitioned for review. In denying the SIA’s petition, the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals stated that its review of the Fed’s decision was quite deferential,
and thus, the court concluded that the Fed’s interpretation of § 20 was
reasonable.162 First, the court held that “the language and structure of
[Glass-Steagall] strongly support[ed]” the Fed’s interpretation.163 Second,
the court held that “neither the legislative history nor the broad purposes of
[Glass-Steagall] compel[led] the conclusion that the order was based on an
impermissible construction of the statute.”164
C. MERGER AND ACQUISITION APPROVALS
1. Framework for Approvals
Financial regulators not only cooperated with the banks in tearing down
the Glass-Steagall wall, but they also approved numerous acquisitions and
mergers of financial holding companies, sometimes even in derogation of
prohibitions against such combinations.
All bank consolidations required the approval of at least one of the
federal banking agencies: the FDIC, the Fed, or the OCC.165 Under § 3 of
the BHCA, the Fed must approve all acquisitions and mergers of bank
holding companies.166 The OCC is the primary banking agency for a
national bank; the Fed, for a state bank that is a member of the Federal
Reserve System; and the FDIC, for a state bank that is not a member of the
Federal Reserve System.167 If the bank consolidation involves both holding
companies and bank levels triggering both acts, then multiple regulatory
agencies may be involved.168
In deciding whether to approve a merger involving a bank holding
company under the BHCA, the Fed is required to consider:
(1) [T]he financial history and condition of the company or companies and the
banks concerned; (2) their prospects; (3) the character of their management;
(4) the convenience, needs, and welfare of the communities and the area

161.
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163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id. at 894.
Id.
Id.
12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1964). The OCC reports merger decisions in the Quarterly Journal,
the FDIC reports in Merger Decisions, and the Fed reports in the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
Rhoades, supra note 33, at 2.
166. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a).
167. Rodgin Cohen, The New Phase of Bank Consolidation: Regulatory Issues and
Considerations, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 63, 66 n.17 (1992) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2)(A)–
(C) (1988)).
168. Id. at 66.
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concerned; and (5) whether or not the effect of such acquisition or merger or
consolidation would be to expand the size or extent of the bank holding
company system involved beyond limits consistent with adequate and sound
banking, the public interest, and the preservation of competition in the field of
banking.169

The Fed must also notify and request the OCC or the appropriate state
banking supervisory authority, depending upon whether the bank is a
national or state bank, to review the application and provide their opinions
and recommendations.170
Similarly, in deciding whether to approve an application for a merger
under the Bank Merger Act of 1960, the appropriate agency is required to
consider:
[T]he financial history and condition of each of the banks involved, the
adequacy of its capital structure, its future earnings prospects, the general
character of its management, the convenience and needs of the community to
be served, and whether or not its corporate powers are consistent with the
purposes of . . . [the Federal Deposit Insurance Act] . . . . [T]he appropriate
agency shall also take into consideration the effect of the transaction on
competition (including any tendency toward monopoly) . . . .171

In addition, an application may be not be approved unless the agency
finds, after reviewing all the factors coupled with the reports from the U.S.
Attorney General and two other banking agencies, “the transaction to be in
the public interest.”172
Generally speaking, the federal regulatory agencies focus on four issues
when analyzing bank acquisition applications: (1) capital adequacy; (2)
credit quality; (3) competition; and (4) Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA) compliance.173
2. Chemical Bank and the Chase Bank Merger (1996)
Chemical Banking Corp. (Chemical Bank) filed various applications
seeking the Fed’s approval for the merger of Chemical Bank with The
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. (Chase Bank).174 The Fed allowed an
extensive time period for public comment, and held a public meeting to
afford interested persons the opportunity to present oral testimony on the
proposed applications.175 In addition, as required by the Bank Merger Act,

169. J. William Via, Jr., The Administration of the Bank Merger and Holding Company Acts:
Confusion Compounded, 51 VA. L. REV. 1517, 1519 (1965) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1964)).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1518 (alteration in original) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)).
172. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1964)).
173. Cohen, supra note 167, at 68 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901, 2906 (1988)).
174. Chemical Banking Corporation, 82 FED. RES. BULL. 239, 239 (1996).
175. Id. at 240.
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the Fed requested reports on the competitive effects of the merger from the
U.S. Attorney General, the FDIC, and the OCC.176
Chemical Bank had total consolidated assets of approximately $178.5
billion and operated banks in New York, Delaware, New Jersey, and
Texas.177 It was the fourth-largest commercial banking organization in the
country, representing 2.6 percent of total U.S. banking assets.178 It also
engaged in nonbanking activities nationwide.179 Chase Bank had total
consolidated assets of approximately $118.8 billion and operated banks in
New York, Delaware, New Jersey, and Florida.180 It was the eighth-largest
commercial banking organization of the United States, representing 1.9
percent of total U.S. banking assets.181 The merger of the two entities
created the largest commercial banking organization in the United States at
the time.182
Under 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2), the Fed cannot approve an application
for a bank holding company to acquire another bank holding company if the
effect of the acquisition “may be substantially to lessen the competition . . .
unless [the Fed] finds that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed
transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable
effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the
community to be served.”183 In accord, the Fed examined (1) competitive
considerations; (2) financial, managerial, and future prospects
considerations; and (3) convenience and needs considerations.184
In order to determine the effect of the merger on competition, first, the
Fed determined the area of effective competition by examining both product
market and geographic market.185 The Fed concluded that the cluster of
banking products and services represented the appropriate line of commerce
for analyzing the effects of this merger application, and that the geographic
market for the cluster of services was local in nature.186 Second, the Fed
engaged in the competitive analysis by looking at numerous factors,
including “the competitive structure of the relevant markets, their
attractiveness to potential entrants, and the number of competitors that
would remain.” It found that the consummation of the Chemical-Chase
merger would not exceed the threshold standard for the Department of
Justice Merger Guidelines in any of the banking markets in which Chemical

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) (1964)).
Id. at 240–44.
Id. at 241.
Id. at 240.
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Bank and Chase Bank would compete directly, and that many competitors
would remain in these markets.187 Lastly, the U.S. Attorney General, the
OCC, and the FDIC did not find that the consummation of the merger
would result in a significant adverse effect on competition in the relevant
banking markets.188
In addition to competitiveness, the Fed looked at capital adequacy, and
at managerial and future prospect considerations. The Fed determined that
both Chemical Bank and Chase Bank significantly exceeded the minimum
capital levels.189 The Fed found that Chemical Bank and Chase Bank could
achieve cost savings and operational efficiencies as a result of the merger
through the consolidation of business, and that both holding companies had
competent and experienced management.190
As required by the CRA, the Fed also looked at the convenience and
needs of the communities to be served.191 Chemical Bank received an
overall CRA performance of “outstanding” from the Fed’s 1995 bank
examination.192 Chase Bank received an overall CRA performance of
“satisfactory.”193 The Fed also examined the CRA reports for the subsidiary
banks of Chemical Bank and Chase Bank, and analyzed the merged entity’s
future plans to enact certain measures to improve the services it would
provide to its communities.194
After reviewing all these factors, the Fed approved the proposed merger
as effective on January 5, 1996. Although this merger did not involve a
bank or a derogation of any geographical or activities statutory restrictions,
it did pave the way for the JPMorgan Chase mega-bank.
3. Travelers Group and Citicorp Merger (1998)
Travelers Group (Travelers) was a holding company for securities and
insurance companies, and Citicorp was a bank holding company under the
BHCA. Travelers sought the Fed’s approval for it to become a bank holding
company by merging with Citicorp and acquiring all of its subsidiary
banks.195 Travelers also requested to acquire Citicorp’s nonbanking
subsidiaries and investments.196
Travelers engaged not only in activities that were permissible for bank
holding companies, but also in nonbanking activities that were not

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 243.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 243–44.
Id. at 244–57.
Id. at 245.
Id.
Id. at 245–46.
Travelers Group Inc., 84 FED. RES. BULL. 985, 985 (1998).
Id.
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permissible for bank holding companies.197 Approximately 70 percent of
Travelers’ total assets and 60 percent of its total revenue were related to
activities that were permissible for bank holding companies under the
BHCA.198 Additionally, Travelers engaged in certain domestic and
international nonbanking activities that bank holding companies were
forbidden from conducting; it proposed to either divest of these activities,
or to conform them to BHCA requirements.199 Further, Travelers controlled
several domestic subsidiaries that § 20 of Glass-Steagall prohibited from
bank affiliation.200 Travelers planned to conform them to Glass-Steagall
requirements.201
At the time of the merger, Citicorp had total consolidated assets of $331
billion, and was the third-largest commercial banking organization in the
United States and the twenty-second-largest commercial banking
organization in the world.202 The consummation of the merger created what
was then, the “largest commercial banking organization in the United States
and the world.”203
The Fed determined that Travelers’ proposal to become a bank holding
company was consistent with the nonbanking limitations in the BHCA
because new bank holding companies had two years to conform or divest
themselves of impermissible activities.204 Many commentators urged the
Fed to hold off on the approval of Travelers until after legislation was
passed repealing Glass-Steagall.205 Instead, the Fed decided to condition
approval of the merger upon Travelers’ conformance to the requirements of
Glass-Steagall. Notably, Sandy Weill, Citicorp’s CEO, rigorously lobbied
for the repeal of Glass-Steagall after the Fed approved the merger. Shortly
thereafter, Gramm-Leach-Bliley, to which many referred as the “Citigroup
Authorization Act,” was passed in 1999.206
Nonetheless, the Fed still examined (1) competitive considerations; (2)
financial, managerial, and future prospects considerations; and (3)

197. Id.
198. Id. Such activities included “securities underwriting, dealing, brokerage, and advisory
activities; mortgage lending and consumer finance activities; consumer advisory activities; and
credit related insurance activities.” Id.
199. Id. (“These activities include[d] underwriting property and casualty, life and commercial
insurance and annuities[.]”).
200. Id. These subsidiaries “engage[d] in securities underwriting and dealing activities,
distributing shares of open-end mutual funds, and controlling open-end mutual funds.” Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 985–86.
203. Id. at 986.
204. Id. at 987.
205. Id. at 986.
206. BARRY RITHOLTZ WITH AARON TASK, BAILOUT NATION: HOW GREED AND EASY MONEY
CORRUPTED WALL STREET AND SHOOK THE WORLD ECONOMY 213 (2009); MONICA LANGLEY,
TEARING DOWN THE WALLS: HOW SANDY WEILL FOUGHT HIS WAY TO THE TOP OF THE
FINANCIAL WORLD . . . AND THEN NEARLY LOST IT ALL 341 (2003).
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convenience and needs considerations.207 The Fed determined that Citicorp
and Travelers both exceeded the relevant capital requirements, and that all
their subsidiaries were well capitalized.208 The Fed also looked at the
managerial structure of the merged entity, and found that both Citicorp and
Travelers had “appropriate risk processes in place,” and that Citigroup was
“expected to have a risk management structure sufficient to manage the risk
of a diverse organization.”209 The Fed determined that the consummation of
the merger would not result in a significant adverse effect on competition
because Travelers did not own a commercial bank.210 Lastly, the Fed
determined that Citicorp, Travelers, and their respective subsidiaries,
received “satisfactory” CRA ratings.211
4. The Chase Bank and J.P. Morgan & Co. Inc. Merger (2000)
Chase Manhattan Corporation (Chase) was a bank holding company
that filed an application with the Fed requesting to merge with J.P. Morgan
& Co. Inc. (J.P. Morgan), and to acquire J.P. Morgan’s subsidiary bank,
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York (Morgan), which was
located in New York, New York.212 The Fed allowed an extensive time
period for public comment, but declined a request for a public hearing.213 In
addition, as required by the Bank Merger Act, the Fed requested reports on
the competitive effects of the merger from the U.S. Attorney General, the
FDIC, and the OCC.214
Chase was the third-largest commercial banking organization in the
United States: with $396 billion in total consolidated assets, it controlled
about 6 percent of the total assets of all FDIC-insured commercial banks.215
Controlling 23.2 percent of the total New York state deposits, it was also
New York’s largest banking organization.216 Morgan was the fifth-largest
commercial banking organization in the United States: with $226.3 billion
in total consolidated assets, it controlled about 4 percent of the total assets
of all FDIC-insured commercial banks.217 Additionally, it controlled 1.9
percent of all New York state deposits, thereby making it the fifteenthlargest New York banking organization.218 After the merger, Chase
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Travelers Group Inc., supra note 195, at 989–1003.
Id. at 989–90.
Id. at 990.
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remained the third-largest commercial banking organization in the nation,
but with total consolidated assets of $662.3 billion.219
In order to determine the effect of the merger on competition, first, the
Fed determined the area of effective competition by examining both the
product market and the geographic market.220 The Fed concluded that the
cluster of banking products and services represented the appropriate line of
commerce for analyzing the effects of this merger application, and that the
geographic market for the cluster of services was local in nature.221 The Fed
determined that Chase and Morgan competed directly in the Metropolitan
New York/New Jersey banking market, the West Palm Beach, Florida
banking market, and the Wilmington, Delaware banking market.222 Second,
the Fed reviewed the competitive effects in each of the banking markets by
considering
the number of competitors that would remain in the markets, the relative
shares of total deposits in depository institutions in the markets . . .
controlled by Chase and Morgan, the concentration level of market
deposits and the increase in this level as measured by the Herfindahl
Hirschman Index under the Department of Justice Merger Guidelines.223

The Fed concluded that the merger would not result in a significant adverse
effect on competition in any of the markets where Chase and Morgan
competed directly, or in any other relevant banking market.224 Chase was
the largest depository institution in the New York market before
consummation of the merger, and would remain so after.225 Also, Chase and
Morgan, then the second- and sixth-largest depository institutions in
Wilmington, respectively, would merge into an entity that would continue
to be the second-largest depository institution in the state of Delaware. In
the West Palm Beach banking market, however, Chase was the fortiethlargest depository institution and Morgan, the twenty-ninth. Even though
the consummation resulted in Chase becoming the twenty-fifth-largest
depository institution in that market, the Fed determined that the market
would remain moderately concentrated with numerous other competitors
despite the rise in ranking within that market.226 The Department of Justice
determined there was no significant adverse effect on competition in any of
the relevant banking markets, and the FDIC and the OCC did not object to
the merger.227
219.
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The Fed also analyzed the capital adequacy and managerial resources of
Chase and Morgan.228 The Fed observed that Chase and Morgan, and their
subsidiary depository institutions, were well capitalized and would remain
well capitalized after consummation of the merger.229 The Fed also found
that the merger would result in a client base and resources that were more
diversified,230 and that both Chase and Morgan were adequately
supervised.231 Therefore, the Fed concluded that the considerations relating
to the financial and managerial resources, and the future prospects, of the
organizations and their supervisory factors were consistent with approval.232
Again, as required by the CRA, the Fed looked at the convenience and
needs of the communities to be served.233 Both Chase and Morgan received
“outstanding” ratings,234 while Chase and Morgan’s subsidiaries received
“outstanding” or “satisfactory” ratings.235 Based on its findings and
analysis, the Fed approved the Chase and Morgan merger on December 11,
2000.
D. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE GROWTH OF THE THREE LARGEST
BANK HOLDING COMPANIES
1. Bank of America
As of June 30, 2011, Bank of America Corporation (Bank of America)
was the largest bank holding company in the United States and one of the
“big four” banks. Over the course of its history, it grew rapidly by using
various holding companies to circumvent prohibitions on branch expansion.
In addition, Bank of America acquired a number of large companies,
including Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company
(Continental), NationsBank Corp. (NationsBank), Countrywide Financial
(Countrywide), and Merrill Lynch & Co. (Merrill Lynch);236 each of these
acquisitions contributed to it becoming the massive conglomerate that was
deemed “too big to fail.” In 2008, the federal government infused Bank of
America with a $45 billion federal bailout through TARP, in addition to
guaranteeing $300 billion in potential losses.237
In 1945, Bank of America, National Trust and Savings Association
(Bank of America NT&SA), predecessor to BankAmerica Corp.
(BankAmerica) and Bank of America, was the largest bank in the United
228.
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Id. at 81.
Id.
Id.
RITHOLTZ, supra note 206, at 219.
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States. During this time period, there were many state and federal
restrictions on branch banking.238 National banks were only allowed to
establish branches in states that granted state banks the right to establish
branches, and needed to get approval from the OCC.239 As a result, the
holding company became a vehicle for banks to establish branches in states
that prohibited branch banking, and for interstate branch banking.240 In
addition, holding companies were used for mergers and consolidations of
other banks, and acquisitions of nonbanking companies.241 Bank of America
NT&SA used its holding company, Transamerica, to circumvent the
prohibitions on interstate branching and further its expansion goals.242 After
its formation in 1928, Transamerica acquired a controlling interest in fortysix banks in five states, acquired 128 other banks which it converted into
branches, acquired and closed seventy-seven additional banks with 123
branches, and acquired 23 percent of the outstanding stock of the Citizens
National Trust and Savings Bank of Los Angeles (Citizens), which had
thirty-four branches.243 By 1949, Transamerica was the largest holding
company.244
The government attempted to reign in Bank of America NT&SA’s
growth on several occasions, but to no avail. First, the government tried to
close the loophole that circumvented prohibitions on interstate branch
banking by introducing a series of anti-bank holding laws and
regulations,245 none of which would survive.246 After Transamerica’s
238. Transamerica—The Bankholding Company Problem, 1 STAN. L. REV. 658, 661–63 (1949).
239. Id. at 661.
240. Id. at 662. Regulators attempted to curtail expansion by: the limitation on banks from
buying securities for their accounts, making it difficult for one bank to obtain control of another
by buying stock; the Clayton Act’s prohibition of control by interlocking directorates; the mergers
and consolidations requirement of approval by two-thirds of a bank’s shareholders; and the
prohibition on banks from using a merger to acquire a nonbanking company. Id. at 662–63.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 659–61. “The holding company is not only a mechanically simple method of
expansion and consolidation, but it is also an excellent device for the circumvention of restrictions
on the growth of banks.” Id. at 661.
243. Id. at 658–59 (citation omitted); STANDARD AND POOR’S, CORP. RECORDS, C-E 916
(1949).
244. Transamerica—The Bankholding Company Problem, supra note 238, at 658–59.
245. These attempts are illustrated below:
The Board secured the introduction of H.R. 2776 and S. 792 (anti-bank holding
company bill) in March 1945, which was withdrawn after extensive opposition
developed. Substituted therefor was H.R. 6225 which died in Committee. On March 6,
1947, S. 829 was introduced by Senator Tobey and is still awaiting Congressional
action.
Note, Judicial Invalidation of Federal Reserve Policy Against Bank Holding Company Expansion,
57 YALE L. J. 297, 299–300 n.14 (1947) (internal citations omitted).
[T]he Secretary was endeavoring to plug up the loophole that had served Giannini in
the past when state or federal officials had sought to halt his branch expansion. During
two successive Congresses the Treasury sent to Capitol Hill bills outlawing bank
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acquisition of Citizens, the Fed tried to reign in Bank of America NT&SA’s
expansion by instructing Transamerica to refrain from engaging in any
future bank-buying negotiations except on the Fed’s recommendations.247
Bank of America NT&SA’s founder, A.P. Giannini, however, refused to
comply.248
The Fed also tried to curb Bank of America NT&SA’s growth by
conditioning the admission of individual banks into the Federal Reserve
System.249 When the Fed rejected Bank of America NT&SA’s application
to open a branch at Lakewood Village, Louisiana, Giannini encouraged the
formation of a state-chartered institution called Peoples Bank.250 The bank
was admitted to the Federal Reserve System under the provision that
Transamerica, Bank of America NT&SA, or any affiliate of either, could
not acquire stock in it without the Fed’s approval; if this provision was
violated, Peoples Bank ran the risk of forfeiting its Fed and FDIC
membership.251 Nevertheless, Transamerica bought stock in Peoples Bank,
and Peoples Bank challenged the legality of the provision in court.252
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that Peoples Bank had nothing to fear
given the Fed’s failure to enforce the provision depriving it of its
membership.253
In 1948, the Fed issued a complaint against Transamerica for violating
the Clayton Act, which prohibited a corporation from acquiring the stock of
another corporation that substantially lessened competition or created a
monopoly.254 In 1952, after almost two years of hearings, the Fed ordered
Transamerica to divest all of its subsidiary banks and dispose of all of its
Bank of America NT&SA stock.255 The Fed’s action was overturned by the
court of appeals, which held that the Fed failed to prove its monopoly
charges against Transamerica.256
In addition to Bank of America NT&SA’s expansion domestically, it
also wanted to open branches internationally.257 The Fed rejected Bank of
holding companies. The bills did not pass, and with new branches denied the Bank of
America, Giannini told Transamerica to resume buying banks.
MARQUIS JAMES & BESSIE R. JAMES, BIOGRAPHY OF A BANK: THE STORY OF BANK OF AMERICA
N.T. & S.A. 495 (1954).
246. JAMES & JAMES, supra note 245, at 495.
247. Id. at 497.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 498.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 501; PAULINE B. HELLER & MELANIE L. FEIN, FEDERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY
LAWS § 17.01[7] (2010).
255. JAMES & JAMES, supra note 245, at 501.
256. Id.; Karmel, supra note 30, at 844 n.142.
257. JAMES & JAMES, supra note 245, at 484.
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America NT&SA’s applications to open branches in Germany, although it
approved its application for Thailand due to special circumstances.258 As a
result, Bank of America NT&SA created a wholly-owned subsidiary, Bank
of America International.259 The subsidiary was able to invest in the stock
of a foreign bank and establish new branches with the consent of both the
Fed and the foreign country.260 Although Bank of America International
only opened one branch in Germany, it illustrates yet another example of
the Fed’s failure to impose regulations to curtail the banks expansionary
efforts.261
In 1957, the Fed finally managed to force Transamerica and Bank of
America NT&SA to separate. Nevertheless, in 1968, BankAmerica was
formed as a holding company for Bank of America NT&SA and its
subsidiaries.262
In the 1980s, Continental was Chicago’s largest bank and one of the top
ten banks in the United States.263 In 1982, Penn Square Bank, N.A. (Penn
Square) in Oklahoma failed.264 Continental had purchased $1 billion in oil
and gas loans from Penn Square and experienced large losses from those
purchases.265 The failure of Penn Square contributed to Continental’s
vulnerability and deposit run.266
Regulators were worried about the impact of Continental’s potential
failure on at least three other financially vulnerable banks: First Chicago,
Manufacturer’s Hanover Trust Corporation (Manufacturer’s Hanover), and
Bank of America NT&SA.267 In fact, Manufacturer’s Hanover’s shares
precipitously dropped after rumors spread about it experiencing funding
difficulties.268 Because the FDIC was unable to find a merger partner and
considered a deposit payoff undesirable, the FDIC purchased $4.5 billion in
bad loans, becoming 80 percent owner of Continental.269 In 1991,
Continental came out of receivership.270 Ironically, despite being one of the
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at 484–85.
Id. at 485.
Id.
Id. at 485–86.
Bankamerica Corporation, in 8 INTERNATIONAL DIRECTORY OF COMPANY HISTORIES 46
(Paula Kepos ed., 2006).
263. Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company, in MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE
FDIC AND RTC EXPERIENCE 456 (1998), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical
/managing/history2-04.pdf.
264. Continental Illinois and “Too Big to Fail,” in HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES–LESSONS FOR
THE FUTURE 241 (1997), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/235_258.pdf.
265. Id. at 241.
266. Id. at 241–44.
267. Id. at 251.
268. Id. (citing WILLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE: HOW THE FEDERAL RESERVE
RUNS THE COUNTRY 626–27, 632–33 (1987)).
269. RITHOLTZ, supra note 206, at 218; MILTON FISK, THE STATE AND JUSTICE: AN ESSAY IN
POLITICAL THEORY 199 (1989).
270. RITHOLTZ, supra note 206, at 218.
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reasons why regulators ended up saving Continental, BankAmerica
acquired Continental for $1.9 billion.271
BankAmerica took a major hit in 1998 because it had lent DE Shaw
$1.4 billion prior to the Russian bond default that caused DE Shaw to suffer
a significant loss.272 NationsBank seized this opportunity and acquired
BankAmerica for $64.8 billion; it renamed itself Bank of America.273 The
resulting entity had combined assets of $570 billion and 4,800 branches
across twenty-two states.274 Despite the size of this newly forged behemoth,
federal regulators only forced Bank of America to divest seventeen
branches in New Mexico.275
In 2007, Bank of America invested “$2 billion in Countrywide
Financial, the nation’s biggest mortgage lender and loan servicer.”276 On
January 11, 2008, Bank of America announced it would buy Countrywide
for $4.1 billion.277 Shortly thereafter, the housing market collapsed.
Nonetheless, Bank of America’s purchase of Countrywide made it the
controlling mortgage loan originator and servicer in the United States.278
On September 14, 2008, Bank of America bought Merrill Lynch,
including its portfolio of toxic assets, for $50 billion.279 During
negotiations, Bank of America CEO Ken Lewis expressed uncertainty
about proceeding with the merger and argued that the “‘material adverse
effect’ clause in the merger document could be triggered by Merrill Lynch’s
deteriorating situation.”280 Lewis claimed the Fed Chairman Ben S.
Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson strong-armed him into
completing the deal by threatening to remove top executives.281
Shareholders approved the deal, but in January 2009, it was revealed that

271. Id.; Bank of America/Continental: Friends for Life, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 5, 1994, at 77
(“Bank of America’s decision to pay $1.9 billion for Chicago’s Continental Bank is of the happier
variety.”).
272. See In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp. 2d 976, 983–84 (E.D. Mo. 1999).
273. Eric R. Quinones, 2 Banking Goliaths Created, CINCINNATI POST, Apr. 13, 1998, at 1A
(discussing that although the deal was technically an acquisition, it provided the structure of a
merger).
274. WALTER JUREK, MERGER AND ACQUISITION SOURCEBOOK 3–188 (1999).
275. 71 BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, BNA’S BANKING REPORT 283 (1998).
276. RITHOLTZ, supra note 206, at 219.
277. Id.
278. Bank of America Corp. Ratings Unaffected by Acquisition of Countrywide, 28 STANDARD
AND POOR’S CREDITWEEK 6 (2008).
279. RITHOLTZ, supra note 206, at 219.
280. See Hugo Duncan, Washington ‘Bullied’ Bank of America into Saving Merrill Lynch from
Collapse, EVENING STANDARD, Feb. 5, 2009, at 32.
281. ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET
AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM CRISIS AND THEMSELVES
535 (2010) (“Ken Lewis threatened to withdraw from the deal, but Paulson and Bernanke pressed
him to complete it or risk losing his job.”).
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Merrill Lynch suffered massive losses in the fourth quarter.282
Consequently, the government gave Bank of America an additional $20
billion in Treasury support and $118 billion of government guarantees. 283
As Barry Ritholtz explains in his book BAILOUT NATION, Bank of
America could spin out into five major pieces: Bank of America, Merrill
Lynch, Countrywide, a toxic holding company, and the rest of its
holdings.284 This is a result of Bank of America’s aggressive expansion both
domestically and internationally via branch banking, and its acquisition of
large, complex companies. Countrywide was the nation’s largest mortgage
loan originator and lender; with its acquisition, Bank of America obtained
control of 20–25 percent of the home loan market in the United States,
making it the largest mortgage originator in the country.285 Merrill Lynch
was one of the leading investment banks, and its acquisition made Bank of
America the largest financial services company in the world.286 In addition,
Bank of America also acquired MBNA, the world’s largest issuer of credit
cards, and China Construction Bank, China’s second-largest bank. The final
product is a mammoth holding company in the United States comprised of a
mishmash of companies: one that was too big to fail . . . and still is.
2. JPMorgan Chase
JPMorgan Chase is one of the “big four” banks, and one of the largest
holding companies in the United States.287 The merger of J.P. Morgan &
Co. Inc. (J.P. Morgan) and Chase Manhattan Corporation (Chase) resulted
in the culmination of “four of the largest and oldest money center banking
institutions in New York City”: J.P. Morgan, Chase, Chemical Bank Corp.,
(Chemical Bank) and Manufacturer’s Hanover Trust Corporation
(Manufacturer’s Hanover).288 Above all, however, JPMorgan Chase is
comprised of more than 1,000 predecessor institutions, including Chemical
Bank.289

282. Heidi N. Moore, Bank of America Merrill Lynch: A $50 Billion Deal from Hell, WALL ST.
J. BLOGS (Jan. 22, 2009, 2:16 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2009/01/22/bank of america merrill
lynch a 50 billion deal from hell/.
283. Joint Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., &
U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury, Federal Reserve, and the FDIC Provide Assistance to Bank of
America (Jan. 16, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg
/20090116a.htm.
284. RITHOLTZ, supra note 206, at 274–75.
285. Associated Press, BofA Completes Deal for Countrywide Financial, USA TODAY, July 1,
2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2008-07-01-364004665_x.htm.
286. TREVOR SYKES, SIX MONTHS OF PANIC: HOW THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS HIT
AUSTRALIA 77 (2010).
287. Shawn Tully, Will the Banks Survive?, FORTUNE, Mar. 16, 2009, at 62, available at http:
//money.cnn.com/2009/02/27/news/economy/tully_banks.fortune/index.htm.
288. History of Our Firm, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., http://www.jpmorganchase.com/
corporate/About-JPMC/jpmorgan-history.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).
289. Id.
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Over the course of its history, Chemical Bank circumvented state and
federal regulatory efforts to expand into a massive multibillion-dollar bank
holding company. For example, in the early 1820s, the New York State
Assembly needed to approve the charter of banks in New York. During that
time, the legislature was hostile toward banks, and it was difficult to obtain
a state charter. It was, however, much easier to get a bank charter approved
if it was part of another business. Therefore, the founders of the bank
incorporated the New York Chemical Manufacturing Company to produce
a variety of chemicals, and petitioned the legislature to amend its charter to
permit the company to conduct banking activities. In 1844, the chemical
company was liquidated when the New York Chemical Manufacturing
Company’s original charter expired, and the company was reincorporated as
a bank under the more liberal banking laws passed in 1838.290
Another example is when the Chemical Bank facilitated its expansion
into other financial areas by forming a bank holding company, Chemical
New York corporation.291
In 1982, Chemical Bank announced that it would merge with Florida
National Banks of Florida, Inc. once interstate banking between New York
and Florida was permitted.292
In 1986, Chemical Bank announced a merger with Horizon Bancorp, a
bank holding company in New Jersey. The actual merger was effected in
1989, when interstate banking between New York and New Jersey was
permitted. Horizon was renamed Chemical Bank New Jersey.293
In 1987, Chemical Bank acquired Texas Commerce Bankshares, one of
the largest bank holding companies in the Southwest. Texas Commerce was
the best capitalized, and had the largest affiliate system, amongst the major
Texan banks. This interstate merger, the largest in U.S. history, allowed
Chemical Bank to expand into another major banking market.294
In 1991, Chemical Bank surpassed its Texas merger by consummating,
what was at the time, the largest bank merger in U.S. history. Its merger
with Manufacturer’s Hanover ,295 which brought the sixth- and ninth-largest
U.S. banks together, was called the “first major bank merger among
equals,” and created the nation’s second-largest bank.296
Finally, in 1995, Chemical Bank and the Chase announced what would
be the largest bank merger in U.S. history. Through a $10 billion stock
290. Chemical Banking Corporation, in 14 INTERNATIONAL DIRECTORY OF COMPANY
HISTORIES 101 (Tina Grant ed., 1996).
291. Id. at 102.
292. Id. at 103.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. In 1961, Manufacturer’s Hanover was created through the merger of Manufacturers Trust
Company and Central Hanover Bank & Trust Company. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., in 38
INTERNATIONAL DIRECTORY OF COMPANY HISTORIES 257 (Jay P. Pederson ed., 2001).
296. Chemical Banking Corporation, supra note 290, at 103.
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swap merger, the top U.S. bank with $297 billion in assets and $20 billion
in investable equity, the fourth-largest amount globally, would be formed.
This institution took the Chase Manhattan name.297 The Fed’s deliberations
in approving the Chase-Chemical merger are discussed above.298
Chase Manhattan Corporation was largely comprised of two banks: the
Bank of Manhattan Company and Chase National Bank. Chase Manhattan’s
earliest predecessor, the Manhattan Company, was formed in 1799. Aaron
Burr, although outwardly organizing the company to supply New York with
clean water to fight the yellow fever, tacitly sought to establish a bank.299
To do so, he surreptitiously inserted a clause into the company charter,
authorizing it to use any leftover capital to engage in other business.300 As a
result, the company was able to create the Bank of Manhattan Company. By
the time the Bank of Manhattan merged with Chase, it was operating sixtyseven New York City branches and was “widely regarded as one of the
most successful and prestigious regional banks in America.”301
Chase National Bank became one of the biggest of its time through its
offering of trust services, and through a series of major mergers of banks in
New York City. Since Chase National Bank was weak on branch banking,
it merged with Bank of Manhattan Company to capitalize on the latter’s
extensive branch network throughout New York City.302
When Glass-Steagall was enacted in 1933, J.P. Morgan & Co., electing
to pursue commercial banking, “spun off its investment banking business as
Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated.”303
In 1940, J.P. Morgan & Co. incorporated in New York, and became J.P.
Morgan & Co., Inc. In 1959, it merged with Guaranty Trust Company to
form Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York (Morgan). In 1969,
Morgan became the principle subsidiary of a newly formed bank holding
company that was also named J.P. Morgan & Co., Inc. (J.P. Morgan).304
J.P. Morgan navigated the investment banking sector outside the United
States, where Glass-Steagall could have no effect, during the late 1960s and
1970s. By the late 1980s, however, U.S. restrictions began to loosen.305
JPMorgan Chase & Co. was formed in 2000, when Chase Manhattan
acquired J.P. Morgan in a deal valued at about $32 billion.306 JP Morgan
Chase would later acquire Bear Sterns & Co. Inc. At the start of 2007, Bear
Stearns & Co. Inc. was the fifth-largest investment bank in the United
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id.
See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., supra note 295, at 253.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 258.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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States; by the end of 2007, however, its market capitalization plummeted,
prompting the Fed to step in to prevent a wider systemic crisis by offering
JP Morgan Chase a deal. In 2008, JPMorgan Chase acquired Bear Stearns
for a $236 million stock swap,307 thereby entrenching itself globally across
a broad range of businesses, which included prime brokerage, cash clearing,
and energy trading.308
Also in 2008, JPMorgan Chase acquired the deposits, assets, and
certain liabilities of Washington Mutual’s (Wamu) banking operations from
FDIC receivership, thereby allowing Chase’s consumer branch network to
expand into California, Florida, and Washington State. This acquisition
created the nation’s second-largest branch network.309
3. Citigroup
Citigroup is one of the “big four” banks, and the third-largest holding
company in the United States. The company is comprised of several firms
that eventually amalgamated into Citicorp,310 which subsequently merged
with Travelers in 1998.311 The resulting mammoth new entity was renamed
Citigroup.312 As a result of this multibillion megamerger, Citigroup became
one of the largest, most complex, and unwieldy holding companies in the
nation.313 This part of the Article focuses on Sandy Weill, the former CEO
of Citigroup, and his creation of a “financial supermarket” using the
“growth-by-acquisition” strategy.314 Weill’s acquisition rampage led to both
Citigroup’s massive growth and its precipitous downfall.315 After the
financial crisis of 2008, Citigroup needed a $45 billion cash infusion from
the federal government.316 Notwithstanding this massive bailout, Citigroup

307. THE ECONOMIST, THE WORLD OF BUSINESS: FROM VALUABLE BRANDS AND GAMES
DIRECTORS PLAY TO BAIL-OUTS AND BAD BOYS 12 (2009).
308. History of Our Firm, supra note 288.
309. Id.
310. Citicorp was a multinational banking corporation operating in more than 100 countries.
311. Travelers covers a variety of businesses including credit services, consumer finance,
brokerage, and insurance.
312. Andrew Martin & Gretchen Morgenson, Can Citigroup Carry Its Own Weight?, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2009, at BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/01/business
/economy/01citi.html.
313. RITHOLTZ, supra note 206, at 212 (describing the merger as “the moment when
[Citigroup] went from being a very large bank to becoming an unmanageable Goliath”).
314. Id. In fact, Weill is commonly known as “the architect of the firm’s ‘financial
supermarket’ strategy.” Id.
315. Id.; Madlen Read & Sara Lepro, Citigroup Breaks Up, “Financial Supermarket” Model
Dead, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 14, 2009, 10:41 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/14
/citigroup-breaks-up-finan_n_157766.html (“Citigroup was the quintessential financial
supermarket, cobbled together over decades by Sandy Weill—the former CEO who is both lauded
for bringing Citigroup its biggest profits ever and criticized for creating an unsustainably massive,
impossible-to-manage conglomerate.”).
316. Martin & Morgenson, supra note 312.
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was forced to spin off many of its businesses,317 and essentially revert back
to its pre-Glass-Steagall days.318 Nevertheless, the repeated failure of
regulators to reign in the banks contributed to Citigroup becoming a
gargantuan holding company that was deemed too big to fail.
The story of Sandy Weill’s growth-by-acquisition strategy begins with
Cogan, Berlind, Weill & Levitt (CBWL), an investment banking and
brokerage firm in the 1960s.319 In the 1970s, the long bull market came to
an end and many firms were failing due to poor management and backoffice breakdowns.320 Under Weill’s direction, CBWL acquired a number of
failing firms at discounted prices, thereby allowing it to grow both in size
and prestige.321 In 1970, CBWL acquired portions of McDonnell & Co., a
sixty-five-year-old elite securities firm with twenty-six branch offices
nationwide.322 The McDonnell acquisition expanded CBWL’s retail
brokerage business outside of New York City.323 In the same year, CBWL
also acquired Hayden Stone, a nationwide brokerage house with sixty-two
branches.324 Subsequently, CBWL changed its name to CBWL-Hayden
Stone to capitalize on the former firm’s prestige.325 In 1973, CBWLHayden Stone acquired H. Hentz & Co., a prestigious retail brokerage firm
with a number of branch offices nationwide.326 In all three of these
acquisitions, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) played a critical role
in facilitating these fire sales to CBWL.327 Furthermore, in the acquisition

317. Id. (describing Citigroup “shedding segments of the company – like insurance and the
brokerage business – that aren’t part of [the global business focus]”). “In trying to right itself,
Citigroup plans to undo much of what it did during a period some insiders call the lost decade –
with events that included merging with Travelers Group in 1998 and a huge, dizzying expansion
of its asset base.” Id.
318. Due to failing structured investment vehicles, the company split into two segments,
Citicorp, consisting of the profitable assets, and Citi Holdings, comprised of toxic assets. See
Associated Press, Citigroup Unit Being Revamped for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2010, at B2.
“Citi is basically going back to close to what it was 30 years ago when I first started in
banking,” says Ezra Zask, a director at the consulting firm LECG, who was a global
trading manager at Mellon Bank in the late-1980s as Citi was expanding its banking
operations. “It’s like a 30-year experiment that didn’t quite work.”
Lauren Tara LaCapra, Citi’s Breakup Leaves Street Skeptical, THE STREET (Jan. 16, 2009, 5:18
PM), http://www.thestreet.com/story/10458265/1/citis-breakup-leaves-street-skeptical.html.
319. DUFF MCDONALD, LAST MAN STANDING: THE ASCENT OF JAMIE DIMON AND
JPMORGAN CHASE 17 (2009). Its predecessor was Carter, Berlind, Potoma & Weill, but Potoma
was disciplined by the NYSE and ousted, and Carter subsequently left. LaCapra, supra note 318.
320. See, e.g., LANGLEY, supra note 206, at 37.
321. MCDONALD, supra note 319, at 17–18.
322. LANGLEY, supra note 206, at 37–38.
323. Id. at 38. Wall Street jokingly called the firm “Corned Beef With Lettuce.” MCDONALD,
supra note 319, at 17–18.
324. LANGLEY, supra note 206, at 39–40; MCDONALD, supra note 319, at 18.
325. LANGLEY, supra note 206, at 40–41.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 38–45 (describing the NYSE’s role in finding an acquirer to buy these failing firms).

2011]

An Orderly Liquidation Authority is Not the Solution

39

of Hayden Stone, the NYSE even agreed to provide CBWL with a $7.6
million cash infusion and to assume all of Hayden Stone’s liabilities.328
Following this growth-by-acquisition trend, CBWL went on to acquire
Shearson Hammill & Co. in 1974;329 Lamson Brothers in 1976; Faulkner,
Dawkins & Sullivan in 1977; and Loeb Rhoades, Hornblower & Company
in 1979.330 The resulting entity was named Shearson Loeb Rhoades.
In 1981, Prudential Insurance Corporation of America acquired Bache
Halsey Stuart Shields, creating a financial powerhouse.331 Instead of firms
consolidating horizontally by buying out their competitors to expand their
operations, the Prudential-Bache acquisition created a financial
conglomerate comprised of an insurance company and a securities firm.332
In order to compete, Shearson Loeb Rhoades allowed American Express to
buy it for $1 billion.333 The company renamed itself Shearson/American
Express.334 In 1985, Weill resigned from American Express.335
Not to be deterred by his struggles at American Express, Weill became
the CEO of Commercial Credit, a subsidiary of Control Data Corporation in
1986.336 Again, Weill employed the growth-by-acquisition tactic and started
building Commercial Credit into a behemoth.337 Commercial Credit
acquired Primerica Corporation, the receivables and insurance branches of
Landmark Financial Services, and the consumer-lending operations of
Barclays American/Financial.338 The firm continued under the name
Primerica.339 Weill ultimately used Primerica as the vehicle to acquire
Travelers, which eventually merged with Citicorp to form Citigroup.340
In April 1998, Travelers merged with Citicorp, the parent company of
Citibank, to create Citigroup. At the time, Citicorp was the world’s largest
supplier of credit cards, and Citibank was the second-largest bank in the
United States. The result was a “financial supermarket”—a one-stop shop
for insurance, investment banking, banking, brokerage, and other financial
services.341 Ritholtz marked this as “the moment when Citi went from being
a very large bank to becoming an unmanageable Goliath.”342
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

Id. at 40.
The firm changed its name to Shearson Hayden Stone. Id. at 48.
Id. at 51. In 1979, the firm changed its name to Shearson Loeb Rhoades. Id. at 58–59.
Id. at 61.
Id.
Ken Auletta, A Superpower Called American Express, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 24, 1985, at

38.

334. Id.
335. LANGLEY, supra note 206, at 88.
336. Biography of Sanford I. Weill, ACADEMY OF ACHIEVEMENT, http://www.achievement.org
/autodoc/page/wei0bio-1 (last updated May 4, 2010, 2:02 PM).
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. David Weidner, R.I.P. the Financial Supermarket: Commentary, MARKETWATCH (Jan.
13, 2009, 4:55 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/citigroups-financial-supermarket-reach
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The merger of Travelers and Citicorp directly challenged GlassSteagall, and under the terms of the Act, Citigroup had two years to divest
any prohibited assets.343 Opponents of Glass-Steagall included Robert E.
Rubin, former Treasury Secretary who would eventually become a
Citigroup board member, and Citigroup’s CEOs Reed and Weill.344 Rubin
testified in Congress that the Act should be repealed; similarly, Weill and
Reed aggressively lobbied to overturn Glass-Steagall.345 In 1999, Congress
passed Gramm-Leach-Bliley, which repealed Glass-Steagall. Significantly,
many referred to the Act as the “Citigroup Authorization Act.”346
After the financial crisis of 2008, the federal government infused the
struggling bank with a $45 billion bailout, and the FDIC guaranteed 90
percent of its losses on its $335 million portfolio. In 2009, Citigroup
announced that it would split itself into two companies: Citicorp and Citi
Holdings, Inc. Citicorp would continue with the traditional banking
businesses, including retail banking worldwide, investment banking, and
transaction services for institutional clients. Citi Holdings, Inc. would own
the toxic assets including asset management and consumer lending, such as
residential and commercial real estate loans, auto loans, and student loans.
This marked the end of the Citigroup’s “financial supermarket”347 as the
firm shrunk back to one third of its original size. The final result is that the
federal government came to own an astounding 36 percent interest in
Citigroup.
Ritholtz writes, “In just about every imaginable way, Citigroup’s
wounds were self-inflicted. From the gargantuan company that was
assembled, to the push for repeal of key regulations, to the way it ran daily
operations—Citi was a classic case of ‘Be careful what you wish for.’”348
Citigroup grew rapidly due to Weill’s growth-by-acquisition strategy—
buying firms cheap and swallowing up their businesses. In addition, the
NYSE facilitated and encouraged many of these acquisitions, and the
legislature repealed the one Act that could have prevented the colossal bank
failures in 2008. The culmination of all of these events led to the creation of
a “financial supermarket” that was too big to tame.

es-its-expiration-date; LaCapra, supra note 318 (describing the “financial supermarket” model as
“a giant, one-stop shopping center for financial services . . . created through a series of mergers.”).
342. RITHOLTZ, supra note 206, at 212.
343. LANGLEY, supra note 206, at 340.
344. See RITHOLTZ, supra note 206, at 212–14.
345. See id. at 213.
346. Id.; LANGLEY, supra note 206, at 341.
347. Read & Lepro, supra note 315.
348. RITHOLTZ, supra note 206, at 216.
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III. MECHANISMS FOR DEALING WITH SIZE AND
COMPLEXITY
The Dodd-Frank structural mechanisms for dealing with the size and
complexity of the mega-banks are very limited. Dodd-Frank requires the
Fed to consider, in the case of a bank acquisition by a bank holding
company, whether the acquisition “would result in greater or more
concentrated risks to the stability of the U.S. banking or financial
system.”349 In the case of a nonbank acquisition, the Fed is required to
consider whether the acquisition poses any risks to the stability of the U.S.
banking or financial system.350 There is a comparable provision for other
financial regulators that may approve a bank acquisition.351 Additionally,
although prior approval is not generally needed when a financial holding
company acquires a company that engages in an activity that is financial in
nature, Fed prior approval will now be needed if the acquisition exceeds
$10 billion in assets.352
If the Fed finds that a systemically important company poses a grave
threat to financial stability, with the approval of two-thirds of the members
of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), the Fed must take
action to mitigate the risk.353 Such action could include “limit[ing] the
ability of the company to merge with . . . or otherwise become affiliated
with another company”; restricting offers of a financial product; ordering
termination of, or imposing restrictions on, activities; or “requir[ing] the
company to sell or otherwise transfer assets or off-balance sheet items to
unaffiliated entities.”354 The only other significant structural reform is the
Volcker Rule, which prohibits any “banking entity”355 from “engag[ing] in
proprietary trading; or from acquir[ing] or retain[ing] any equity,
partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsor[ing] a hedge fund or a
private equity fund.”356
More drastic curtailment of concentration and growth limits has been
left either to studies or to future Fed rulemaking. Six months after the
passage of Dodd-Frank, the FSOC was required to complete a study on the
prohibition on acquisitions by firms where the total assets of the resulting

349. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 604(d), 124 Stat. 1376, 1601 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq. (2010))
(amending Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(7)).
350. Id. § 604(e)(1).
351. Id. § 354.
352. Id. § 604(e)(2).
353. See id. § 716(l).
354. Id. § 121.
355. “Banking entity” is defined as “any insured depository institution,” or “any company that
controls” such an institution, or any company “that is treated as a bank holding company” under
the International Banking Act. Id. § 619(h)(1).
356. Id. § 619 (stating that the “Volcker Rule” is implemented by § 619 of Dodd-Frank).
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company would exceed 10 percent of aggregate U.S. liabilities.357 The
FSOC released this study on January 17, 2011.358 Pursuant to the
requirements of Dodd-Frank, the FSOC made recommendations to the Fed
on what rules should be passed in order to best implement the concentration
limit.359 The FSOC made three recommendations. The first two were
largely procedural, and involved a new definition of “liabilities” so that all
financial companies would be on equal footing with regard to the
concentration limit,360 and a change in the way the aggregate liabilities of
financial companies is calculated so that short-term unexpected events do
not introduce unintended volatility into the market.361 The third
recommendation covered the exception to the concentration limit for
acquisitions of banks in default or in danger of default. The application of
the exception is subject to the Fed’s approval. The FSOC recommends that
the exception should be broadened from “banks” to “failing insured
depository institutions.”362 The issue with this exception, in both its original
form and the form the FSOC recommends, is that it could make the
concentration limit superfluous. As covered in the earlier sections of this
Article, many of the acquisitions made by the too-big-to-fail behemoths
were of struggling banks and other financial institutions. Furthermore,
requiring the Fed to consent to the deal is not adequate protection as many
of these acquisitions were either approved, or, in some instances, suggested,
by the Fed. This is akin to leaving the fox guarding the henhouse.
Within nine months of the FSOC study, the Fed must issue rules, taking
into account the FSOC’s recommendations, limiting merger and acquisition
transactions that would result in a company holding greater than 10 percent
of the aggregate consolidated liabilities of all financial companies.363
Within eighteen months after the enactment of Dodd-Frank, the Fed must
issue concentration limits for large interconnected bank holding companies
with more than $50 billion in assets and for systemically important nonbank
financial companies. Among other things, these rules must prohibit such
companies “from having credit exposure to any unaffiliated company that
exceeds 25 percent of the capital stock and surplus” of the company.364

357. Id. § 622(e)(1).
358. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY

AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING
CONCENTRATION LIMITS ON LARGE FINANCIAL COMPANIES (Jan. 17, 2011), available at http://
www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/Study on Concentration Limits on Large Firms 01-1711.pdf.
359. Id. at 3.
360. Id. at 16–20.
361. Id. at 20–21.
362. Id. at 21–22.
363. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 622(e)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1633–34 (2010)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1852(e)(2) (2010)).
364. Id. § 165(e)(2).
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Others have proposed more drastic limitations on size in order to
address the disproportionate wealth and power that is concentrated in a
handful of large banks in the financial sector. Simon Johnson and James
Kwak have asserted that, without taking action that is focused on the size of
these institutions, there is no reason to believe the same situation the world
faced in 2008 will not occur again at the end of the next boom and bust
cycle.365 Although the Obama administration had used lofty language, its
proposals, and what resulted from them, did little to get at the main
problem: “the enormous growth of top-tier financial institutions and the
corresponding increase in economic and political power.”366 After the
government rescue in 2008–2009, Wall Street banks effectively emerged
with “less competition, a strengthened governmental guarantee, and no new
restrictions on the pursuit of profits.”367 The idea that certain banks were
“too big to fail” has resulted in a small number of the powerful banks being
able to adopt riskier policies than their competitors because they, and their
creditors and counterparties, know that the government will not allow them
to fail.368
Johnson and Kwak believe the goal should be a financial system where
banks can fail without adversely affecting the entire economy.369 They
dismiss the technocratic approaches of the Obama administration, and
Dodd-Frank, and instead, drawing support from many, including Alan
Greenspan, propose a solution: financial institutions should not be allowed
to grow so big that they cannot fail, and those that already are that big
should be broken up.370 The argument continues that if there were no banks
that were too big to fail, there would be no implicit guarantee that the
government would support some banks and not others. Without such a
guarantee, creditors and counterparties would be more likely to ensure that
banks do not take on too much risk, and consequently, banks would not be
likely to take on excessive risks that could lead to the next financial
crisis.371
Johnson and Kwak propose a solution that incorporates the existing
financial regulations of minimum capital requirements and oversight, with a
cap on size, whereby “no financial institution would be allowed to control
or have ownership interests in assets worth more than a certain percentage
of U.S. GDP. . . . [This number] should be low enough that banks below
that threshold [can fail] without [imposing] serious risk[s] to the financial
system.”372 The suggestion is no more than 2 percent for investment banks,
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.

SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS 190 (2010).
Id. at 191.
Id. at 191–92.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 214.

44

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 6

and no more than 4 percent for all other banks. Since 1994, the United
States has had a rule prohibiting any single bank from holding more than 10
percent of total retail deposits; however, this was waived in 2009 for
JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo. Another suggestion is
that limits on size should not be set by regulators, who could adjust the
limits as “memories of the recent crisis fade,” but rather by Congress,
which will then leave the task of enforcing the limits to the regulators.373
Size limits could create a financial system that is less vulnerable to systemic
risk, competitive distortions, and the failure of a single bank.
On the other hand, some have argued that smaller banks are not
necessarily less risky banks.374 Also, large financial institutions provide
certain advantages to the economy, especially with regard to the funding of
large, cross-border companies.375 Therefore, other solutions to the too-bigto-fail problem have been proposed, such as increased capital requirements
and better prudential regulation.
Another idea has been proposed by Joseph Stiglitz, who criticizes
policies of the Bush and Obama administrations that viewed the megabanks as not only too big to fail, but also too big to be resolved or
financially restructured under normal procedures, whereby shareholders
would be wiped out and bondholders would be converted to shareholders.376
His solution for the problem of banks deemed “too big to fail” is to break
them up for the reason that banks too big to fail are too big to exist.377
Without evidence that these large banks operate so much more efficiently
than smaller institutions that it would be costly to restrict their size, Stiglitz
sees no reason not to break up these large banks. Indeed, the too-big-to-fail
banks are also too big to be managed; and their competitive advantage
comes from their “monopoly power” and from “implicit government
subsidies” and guarantees, not from their size.378
Stiglitz suggests the big banks return to traditional banking, while their
“commingled activities” including insurance, investment banking, and other
activities not essential to the function of commercial banking, be spun
off.379 While he views size limits as subject to regulatory lapses, he suggests
a “three-pronged attack”: (1) breaking up institutions that are too big to fail;
(2) “restricting . . . activities in which [the] remaining institutions can be
engaged”; and (3) correlating “deposit insurance and capital adequacy

373. Id. at 214–15.
374. Edward F. Greene et al., A Closer Look at ‘Too Big to Fail’: National and International
Approaches to Addressing the Risks of Large, Interconnected Financial Institutions, 5 CAPITAL
MARKETS L.J. 117, 124 (2010).
375. Id. at 124–25.
376. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL 164 (2010).
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restrictions to [even out] the playing field.”380 He acknowledges that
activity restrictions might “result in lower returns for big banks,” as there
should also be an elimination of incentive structures in employee
compensation that “encourage excessive risk-taking and shortsighted
behavior.”381 Stiglitz also thinks that the Fed and the Treasury Department
need clearer authority to resolve financial institutions when the failure of an
institution would put the entire economy at risk.382 This would need to
happen in conjunction with the break-up of institutions that are too big to
even exist.383 There is a need for affirmative prevention measures, rather
than just resolution authority to prevent the same thing from happening
again.384
The idea of narrow banking was proposed long before the recent crisis.
In 1987, Robert Litan suggested that state and federal regulators should not
allow financial product diversification unless banking and nonbanking
activities were carried out in separate, but related corporations.385 His idea
of “narrow” or “safe” banking was the separation of deposit taking from
risk-bearing activities. This would eliminate the potential risk that
depositors’ funds would be used to bail out the risky, nonbanking activities,
or used by the nonbank affiliates, where it would have the greater potential
to be lost.386 Narrow banks operating with separation requirements would
only be permitted to “invest[] in high-quality, marketable instruments,” and
would be restricted from “channel[ing] funds to support affiliated
corporations or their customers.”387 This would prevent a situation where
the failure of a nonbanking affiliate would trigger a deposit run on the bank,
necessitating federal intervention.388 Narrow banking would also address
the problems associated with the large financial institutions and their
concentration of economic power, and resolve conflict of interest issues.389
Litan’s separation and narrow banking ideas were proposed in the context
of how financial product diversification could progress rapidly while
protecting the greater financial system against the risks that product
diversification entails.390
A more recent version of a similar proposal has the title of “limited
purpose banking,” limiting banks to their original purpose of acting as an
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intermediary between borrowers and lenders, and savers and investors.391
Under this proposal, all financial and insurance companies with limited
liability, that are engaged in financial intermediation, would operate solely
as the intermediary, never owning the assets itself or borrowing to invest in
anything except specific assets needed to run their operations, thereby
acting similarly to a “pass-through mutual fund.”392 The role of an
intermediary requires no risk taking at all. Under limited purpose banking,
banks would be free to sell and act as the intermediary for customers that
want to invest in any type of mutual fund, including two new types: “cash
mutual funds and insurance mutual funds.”393 Additionally, under the
limited purpose banking proposal, all state and federal regulatory
authorities would be replaced by a single regulatory authority, the “Federal
Financial Authority,” which would “verify, supervise custody, fully
disclose, and oversee the rating and trades of all securities” that are
“purchased, held and sold by the [limited purpose banking] mutual
funds.”394
With the limited exception of the Volcker Rule,395 ideas for curbing the
size, concentration, and complexity of the big banks were rejected in DoddFrank. Instead, the statute embraced better capital adequacy requirements
and better supervision by financial regulators, and an orderly resolution
authority in the event such regulation fails to prevent the failure of one or
more financial institutions. In view of the role that the financial regulators
played in creating the mega-banks, it is not surprising that efforts to cut
them down to a smaller size were resisted. Moreover, the actions by these
agencies in implementing Dodd-Frank are strengthening the dominant
position of the mega-banks.396
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